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REVIEW ESSAYS 
Judicial Matters 
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 
By Gerald N. Rosenberg.t Chicago, Illinois: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1991. Pp. vii, 425. Cloth. 
Reviewed by Neal Devins! 
Imagine the rights of criminal defendants without Mapp v. Ohio 1 or 
Miranda v. Arizona ;2 the rights of women without Roe v. Wade ;3 or the 
rights of racial minorities without Brown v. Board of Education. 4 For 
those who see the courts "as powerful, vigorous, and potent proponents 
of change" (p. 2), that world would be horrific-"a land in which women 
would be forced into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated 
lunch counters, [and] rogue police could break down citizens' doors in 
midnight raids."5 Indeed, the political furor over Clarence Thomas, 
Robert Bork, and other Supreme Court nominees is largely informed by 
the belief that Supreme Court Justices wield enormous political power. 
This belief also explains, as Justice Scalia complained, why the Justices 
are subject to "carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of dem-
onstrators, urging us-their unelected and life-tenured judges . . .-to 
follow the popular will."6 
This portrayal of the Court as a player, shaping policy through deci-
sions with a nationwide impact, is hardly surprising. To suggest other-
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago. 
t Associate Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. 
B.A. 1978, Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. The author would like to 
thank: Wendy Watson for her able and cheerful research assistance; William and Mary colleagues 
who commented on an earlier draft of this essay through workshops coordinated by the law school's 
enrichment committee and the Social and Political Theory Discussion Group; and Bob Katzmann 
and Jeremy Rabkin for their comments on an earlier draft. All errors are my own. 
1. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
2. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
3. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
4. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
5. That is how Senator Edward Kennedy described "Robert Bork's America" in a speech he 
delivered from the Senate floor. 133 CONG. REC. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
6. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). On the question of whether judges should be removed from overt political 
demonstrations, see Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional Cases, 61 U. 
CoLO. L. REV. 685 (1990). 
1027 
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wise, that court decisions are of little consequence in altering 
bureaucratic and institutional practices, seems preposterous. This 
counterintuitive thesis, however, lies at the heart of Gerald Rosenberg's 
The Hollow Hope. Pointing to "severe limitations" in the "design[ ]" of 
American courts, Rosenberg concludes that courts "rarely ... can make 
a difference" (pp. 342-43). Meaningful reform, instead, is accomplished 
through social movements and elected branch initiatives. 
The Hollow Hope, by suggesting that courts "rarely" matter, breaks 
new ground in the debate over the judicial role. Others have fought over 
the consistency of court-ordered social reform with the separation of 
powers, the propensity of courts to advance individual rights, the vulner-
ability of courts to elected branch reprisals, the capacity of courts to 
effectively administer institutional reform, the impact of such court 
orders, and the propriety of elected government efforts to shape constitu-
tional norms. 7 While this debate is far-reaching and sharp lines have 
been drawn on every issue, it presupposes that courts (for better or 
worse) make a difference. By challenging this assumption, The Hollow 
Hope seeks to fundamentally change the way social reformers, academ-
ics, and politicians view the courts. 
Rosenberg accomplishes this task by measuring both the direct and 
indirect effects of court action. 8 Direct effects concern changes in institu-
7. For even-handed overview discussions of the judicial activism debate, see CHARLES A. 
JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (1984); 
MICHAEL A. REDELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS 3-
15 (1982); Robert A. Katzmann, Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing 
Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513, 513-18 (1980). For arguments that far-
reaching judicial policymaking is an inevitable outgrowth of congressional incentives and judicial 
attributes, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976) (arguing for a broader judicial role when dictated by the needs of justice); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 
HARV. L. REv. 465 (1980) (arguing that modem broader judicial roles are consistent with 
traditional judicial attributes); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial 
Supervision of Public Institutions. 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1269-88 (tracing the roots of the modem 
judicial role). For criticisms of judicial policymaking, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE CoURTS 
AND SOCIAL PoLICY (1977) (arguing that courts lack the institutional attributes ofpolicymakers); R. 
SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS (1983) (arguing that courts cannot manage 
unintended consequences of their decisions); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS (1989) 
(arguing that courts improperly transform government agencies into agencies of constituent 
interests); Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in 
Public Institutions. 65 VA. L. REv. 43, 88-106 (1979) (same); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers 
and the &ope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REv. 661, 718-23 (1978) (arguing that 
separation of powers limits judicial lawmaking). For defenses of judicial policymaking, see REDELL 
& BLOCK, supra, at 205-10 (arguing that courts are good factfinders and able administrators); 
Eisenberg & Yeazell, supra, at 495-501 (arguing that separation of powers demands judicial 
policymaking); Stephen L. Washy, Book Review, 31 VAND. L. REV. 727, 744-47 (1978) (arguing 
that legislatures and courts share comparable deficiencies in making sound policy). 
8. Rosenberg considers both constitutional and statutory matters, although he limits his 
inquiry to federal claims in federal courts. State court interpretations of state constitutional 
provisions arc not considered at all. This is unfortunate, for state courts increasingly play a 
leadership role on questions involving the exclusionary rule, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
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tiona! behavior attributable to court action; indirect effects are court-
influenced changes in social attitude and political behavior. Through an 
examination of the immediate effect of the decision, opinion polls (mea-
suring both awareness of Court opinions and changes in attitude as a 
result of the ruling), news coverage of issues that were subject to Court 
decision, and other measures, a startling conclusion is reached: court 
action "seldom bring[s] reform any closer'' (p. 343) and often 
"strengthen[s] the opponents of such change" (p. 342). Changes in race 
relations, gender roles, criminal procedure, and the environment often 
attributed to court action, instead, are the product of independent action 
taken by elected government and social refonn movements. 
Rosenberg's objective is not simply to deconstruct the judiciary. He 
seeks to transform his findings of judicial impotence into a call for action, 
not despair: social reformers accomplish more by seeking change 
through "mobilizing citizens" and other "political" means than through 
expensive and often counterproductive litigation (p. 343). This conclu-
sion suggests images of the phoenix of social reform rising from the ashes 
of failed judicial activism. When juxtaposed with the Relmquist Court, 
whose raison d'etre often appears the repudiation of social reform-ori-
ented judicial activism, The Hollow Hope's message is forceful.9 
The Hollow Hope, moreover, is perfectly timed. With civil rights 
interests, women's groups, and environmentalists increasingly turning to 
elected government and away from the courts, Rosenberg delivers a pro-
vocative justification for such behavior and encourages more of it. If 
Rosenberg is correct and social reform can only be accomplished 
through political means, then the Rehnquist Court is a blessing in 
disguise for liberals. By refusing to play an affirmative 
countermajoritarian role, the Relmquist Court may encourage populist 
initiatives. If Rosenberg is wroug and the courts play a vital role in 
reforming society, then the complacency of the Rehnquist Court tragi-
cally negates a critical engine for social reform. 
equal educational opportunity, and privacy. See Louis Fisher, How the States Shape Constitutional 
Law, STATE LEGISLATURES, Aug. 1989, at 37. In Right to Choose v. Byrne, for example, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court provided broader privacy protections than the U.S. Supreme Court, 
explaining that "[a]lthough the state Constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the federal 
constitution, our constellation of rights may be more complete." 450 A.2d 925, 931 (N.J. 1982). For 
commentary on the importance of state constitutional interpretation, see William J. Brennan, Jr., 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Robert F. 
Williams, State Constitutional Law: Teaching and Scholarship, 41 J. LEGAL Eouc. 243 (1991). For 
commentary on the ability of special interest groups to successfully advance their agenda through 
state court litigation, see Donald N. Jensen & Thomas M. Griffin, The Legalization of State 
Educational Policymaking in California, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS 325, 325 (David L. Kirp & 
Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986) ("The result is that there are fewer areas of educational policy now left 
to local discretion than ever before."). 
9. See DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT (1992). The 1992 Rehnquist Court rulings on 
school prayer and abortion do not dispel this suggestion. Instead, these decisions indicate that a bare 
majority of the current Court is reluctant to disavow long-standing, highly controversial precedents. 
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The truth, not surprisingly, lies somewhere between the image of the 
Court as a vigorous agent of social change and Rosenberg's portrayal of 
judicial ineffectiveness. This Review Essay will define and defend that 
middle ground. In so doing, The Hollow Hope will be both vilified and 
applauded. The book deserves harsh criticism because its conclusions 
are checkered by problems of emphasis, articulation, and analysis. It 
endorses inconsistent measures of effective judicial action, focuses on the 
Court in isolation rather than as part of a larger political culture, uses 
presumptions hostile to the recognition of a broad judicial role, and 
employs inadequate data and questionable portrayals of existing 
research. To the extent that The Hollow Hope intimates that court-
ordered reform is an oxymoron, these problems are fatal. 
Strangely, The Hollow Hope can stand tall, if not erect, even in the 
face of the deficiencies noted above. The image of judicial impotence 
suggested by Rosenberg is rooted as much in the author's questionable 
presentation as in his analysis. Specifically, in an effort to isolate and 
quantify the Court's impact, short shrift is given to the essential role that 
courts do play in "constitutional dialognes"10 with elected government. 
With little effort, Rosenberg's articulation can be recalibrated and The 
Hollow Hope can serve as a testament to the fundamental role played by 
nonjudicial actors in shaping constitutional values. 
Rosenberg convincingly shows that courts cannot do it alone. Con-
gress, the White House, the states, and interest groups also play a pivotal 
role. State efforts to legalize abortion before Roe, congressional and 
administrative efforts to eliminate dual school systems, and the civil 
rights and women's movements highlight a remarkable inventory of non-
judicial influences identified by Rosenberg. The Hollow Hope also does 
an extraordinary job of demonstrating that numerous landmark Supreme 
Court opinions were little known and even less discussed at the time of 
decision. In fact, Rosenberg's evidence of the paramount role played by 
nonjudicial forces is one of the strongest to date. 
The Hollow Hope then offers abundant support for a more modest, 
more accurate, and equally important thesis: the Supreme Court works 
within and hence both influences and is influenced by a larger culture of 
political and social interests. While severe problems in analysis still 
remain, this rearticulation accomplishes Rosenberg's principal objective 
of sobering those who endorse an active judicial role. That this account-
ing is less vitriolic, less provocative, and less pathbreaking than the thesis 
Rosenberg suggests seems an acceptable price for accuracy. 
This Review Essay will advance this alternative formulation in the 
following ways. First, this Review Essay will identify problems in 
Rosenberg's articulation and analysis. Second, an alternative depiction 
10. This phrase is borrowed from LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988). 
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of The Hollow Hope will be suggested. This depiction will show that 
Rosenberg's work-stripped of its provocative veneer-makes a good 
(albeit flawed) case for seeing constitutional decisionmaking as a combi-
nation of judicial and nonjudicial forces. Moreover, through an exami-
nation of issues both discussed and ignored in The Hollow Hope, 11 this 
alternative formulation will be defended. Third, this Review Essay will 
suggest the significance of these findings to developing modem day strat-
egies for seeking social reform. 
I 
THE HOLLOW HOPE DESCRIBED 
Rosenberg begins his inquiry with a series of questions "important 
for understanding the role of any political institution, yet . . . seldom 
asked of courts[:] ... To what degree, and under what conditions, can 
judicial processes be used to produce political and social change? What 
are the constraints that operate on them? What factors are important 
and why?" (pp. 1-2). Two answers are suggested-one a "constrained 
view," the other a "dynamic view." The constrained view emphasizes 
inherent limits in the reach of judicial authority, namely: (1) courts are 
grounded "by precedent and the beliefs of the dominant legal culture" 
and hence are unlikely to play the role of social crusader (pp. 10-13); 
(2) the power of elected government to appoint and confirm, to strip the 
courts of jurisdiction, and to argue cases deprives the judiciary of the 
necessary independence to produce significant social reform (pp. 13-15); 
and (3) "[c]ourts lack the tools to readily develop appropriate policies 
and implement decisions ordering significant social reform" (pp. 15-21). 
The dynamic view, in contrast, "sees courts as powerful, vigorous, and 
potent proponents of change" (p. 2). Specifically, this model portrays 
judges as well-qualified policy analysts who are willing to protect the 
underrepresented and whose decisions not only are obeyed but also set 
the tone of future debate (pp. 21-30). The Hollow Hope, rather than see-
ing the truth as somewhere between these poles, fully embraces the con-
strained court model. 
Rosenberg concludes that "effective" and "significant" court-
ordered reform only takes place when nonjudicial actors support such 
reform by, for example, offering incentives for compliance, imposing pen-
alties for noncompliance, implementing the decision through pre-existing 
market mechanisms, and using the decision as a justification for action 
for those already willing to act (pp. 30-36). Rosenberg also concludes 
11. The following topics will be considered in this Review Essay: race and education, 
affirmative action, employment discrimination, women's rights, abortion, and, of course, the 
legislative veto. Admittedly, my choice of topics is selective. However, since 1 consider those issues 
to be at the heart of THE HOLLOW HoPE, my choices are appropriate to a review of Rosenberg's 
analysis. 
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that Supreme Court decisions neither reshape public discourse nor spur 
on legislative and administrative initiatives. By examining press cover-
age, elected government action in the immediate wake of the opinion, 
public recognition of the Court, and other political, social, and economic 
factors at work, Rosenberg finds little evidence supporting the claim that 
the Court is an effective prod. Indeed, Rosenberg finds some evidence 
indicating that the Court has had an adverse influence (pp. 155-56, 182, 
342). 12 Pointing to these findings, Rosenberg argues that the burden of 
proof now rests on those who herald the Court's indirect influence (p. 
110). 
The key to these surprising conclusions is The Hollow Hope's exam-
ination of civil rights and women's rights. In both instances, Rosenberg 
concludes that the Court's impact has been negligible at best and 
counterproductive at worst. On civil rights, he asserts both that "courts 
contributed little to civil rights" (p. 169) and that "changes in civil rights 
could plausibly have happened without Supreme Court action" (p. 169). 
Moreover, in a disturbing passage, he assails Brown: "By stiffening 
resistance and raising fears before the activist phase of the civil rights 
movement was in place, Brown may actually have delayed the achieve-
ment of civil rights" (p. 156). On women's rights, he speaks of "the lack 
of judicial and extra-judicial effects of Court decisions" (p. 265), saying 
that "the Court is far less responsible for the changes that occurred than 
most people think" (p. 201), and that the growth of "right-to-life" forces 
in the wake of Roe suggests "that one result of litigation to produce sig-
nificant social reform is to strengthen the opponents of such change" (p. 
342). 
Rosenberg's conclusions on civil rights derive, for the most part, 
from his evaluation of Brown and its aftermath. Claiming that "[t]he 
Court had spoken clearly and forcefully" (p. 45) in its 1954-64 school 
desegregation decisions, Rosenberg attributes the failure of southern 
desegregation to constraints on the judicial power in the face of wide-
spread hostility to Brown. For example, President Eisenhower publicly 
refused to comment on the case and privately criticized the decision (p. 
76), state legislatures enacted 136laws and constitutional amendments in 
the three years after Brown (p. 79), and private groups resorted to vio-
lence and intimidation (ranging from newspaper publication of the names 
of blacks who signed a petition in support of desegregation to the bomb-
ing of black churches and murder) (pp. 82-83). The consequence of this 
12. The focus of Rosenberg's analysis is the period immediately following a Court decision. 
For Rosenberg, "the more time that elapses between the order and the action, the more tenuous is 
the causal link" (p. 109). Other commentators, however, argue that the impact of Court decisions is 
not capable of accurate measure until some period of years has passed. See JOHNSON & CANON, 
supra note 7, at 257 ("Usually some time must pass before new symbols aehieve widespread 
acceptance .... "); see also infra note 26 (discussing the long-term impact of the exclusionary rule 
and Miranda). 
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hostility was that in the decade after Brown only 1.2% of black children 
attended school with white children, demonstrating, in the words of 
Rosenberg, that "Brown and its progeny stand for the proposition that 
courts are impotent to produce significant social reform," (p. 71) "con-
tribut[ing] virtually nothing to ending segregation . . . in the Southern 
states" (p. 52). 
Rosenberg likewise concludes that Brown did not serve as a catalyst 
to other political and legal challenges to race discrimination. Recogniz-
ing that "there are no precise and exact measures that can be applied" (p. 
109) to quantify indirect effects, a host of factors are considered: press 
coverage, opinion polls, and legislative and executive actions that make 
reference to a decision. None of these measures, in Rosenberg's estima-
tion, indicate that Brown shaped public discourse on civil rights. For 
example, media coverage of civil rights, both in large circulation 
magazines (Reader's Digest, Life) and elite publications (New Republic, 
New York Times Magazine), did not increase at the time of the decision 
(pp. 111-16); reference to Brown in debates over civil rights legislation in 
1957, 1960, and 1964 occupied "only a few dozen out of many thousands 
of pages" (p. 120); public opinion on school desegregation did not change 
in the immediate aftermath of Brown (pp. 127-31 ); Brown did not prompt 
public demonstrations and marches (pp. 133-50); and financial support 
for and membership in civil rights groups was unaffected by the decision 
(pp. 150-55). 
In finding Brown's effects inconsequential, The Hollow Hope argues 
that civil rights reforms are attributable to federal action directed at 
southern school systems in response to sit-ins, boycotts, and other nonju-
dicial pressures. 13 The conclusion that nonjudicial forces were behind 
these changes is convincingly evidenced in the growth in demonstrations, 
news coverage, and civil rights group support in the wake of the 1956 
Montgomery bus boycott, the sit-in movement of the early 1960s, the 
1961 freedom rides, and police brutality in the 1963 Birmingham demon-
strations. Rosenberg charts each of these episodes and finds that both 
individually and collectively, these events mattered much more than the 
Brown decision (pp. 133-56). Additionally, the rise of the black electo-
rate helped spur the federal government into action, and the south 
became more receptive to change due to the influx of northern businesses 
ready to invest in a desegregated south (pp. 157-62). The best that can be 
said about the Court, for Rosenberg, was that it swam with and thus 
13. According to Rosenberg, "[t)he actions of the Supreme Court appear irrelevant to 
desegregation from Brown to the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 ESEA 
[Elementary and Secondary Education Act) (p. 52)," legislation spurred on by "growing civil rights 
pressure from the 1930s, economic changes, the Cold War, population shifts, electoral concerns, the 
increase in mass communication" (p. 169). 
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became part of a current of history; but "[t]hat current was growing in 
force and . . . the Court contributed little to it" (p. 169). 
Rosenberg is on strong footing in arguing that legislative reform, not 
court action, prompted school desegregation. 14 In the decade following 
Brown, less actual desegregation of southern schools occurred than in 
1965 alone. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,15 
making available billions of dollars in educational assistance, coupled 
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act's (Title VI) demand that federal grant 
recipients not discriminate, 16 spurred recalcitrant southern systems to 
alter their segregationist practices. For example, for the 1965-66 school 
year, the percentage of black children in biracial schools in Southern 
states rose from two percent to six percent.17 From 1968 to 1972, school 
districts acting under federal administrative pressure were less segregated 
than those acting under court order (p. 53). 
The Hollow Hope's assessment of abortion and women's rights, 
while less detailed and less systematic, reaches similar conclusions. 
Indeed, Rosenberg uses identical metaphors, speaking of the Court as 
"join[ing]," "not creat[ing]," "a current of social change and a tide of 
history" (p. 265). Moreover, like his analysis of civil rights, Rosenberg 
sees courts as trying to play a leadership role but failing: "[A]s with civil 
rights ... the Court is far less responsible for the changes that occurred 
than most people think" (p. 201); "[a]dvocates of women's rights have 
'won' quite a number of legal cases" (p. 212), but "[p]recedent-setting 
decisions in women's rights have produced little because courts lack all 
the essential tools required of any institution hoping to implement 
change" (p. 227). 
Roe v. Wade, rather than being characterized as a watershed, is seen 
as solidifying a "widespread, vocal, and effective" pro-choice lobby (p. 
184). That forty-six state laws were invalidated under Roe is down-
played; highlighted, in its stead, are statistics showing that the rate of 
legal abortions rose more dramatically the two years before Roe (300%, 
from 193,500 in 1970 to 586,800 in 1972) than the two years after Roe 
14. This contention is well accepted. See GARY 0RFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF 
SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 356-57 (1969) (arguing 
that constraints limited the courts to effecting symbolic change, and that changes in school 
segregation required the mobilization of Congress and the fedeml bureaucracy); Neal Devins & 
James Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation 
Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1243, 1245-51 (1984) (arguing that the first major inroads to 
southern school desegregation followed from the implementation of legislative reforms, not court 
decisions). 
IS. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C. 
(1990)). 
16. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1981)). 
17. STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
ADMINISTERS A LAW 153 (1968). 
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(52%, from 586,800 in 1972 to 898,600 in 1974) (pp. 178-80). Rosenberg 
also minimizes Roe's impact by arguing that nonjudicial market mecha-
nisms were critical in effectuating the decision. Specifically, had Roe 
demanded that abortions be performed in hospitals, the widespread 
refusal ofhospitals to perform abortions (only 17% of public and 23% of 
private hospitals perform abortions) suggests that the case's impact 
would have been negligible (pp. 189-201). 
Rosenberg's examination of "women's rights" is also critical of the 
Court. Noting that the gap between men's and women's earnings has 
stayed constant since 1955, that litigation has not affected the wage 
structure, that most employment is sex-segregated, and that the ABA 
Committee on Judicial Selection typically gives better ratings to men 
than women, Rosenberg deems court action in this area inconsequential 
(pp. 207-12). The crux of the problem, instead, is a long list of social ills, 
including domestic violence, disproportionate household work, inade-
quate child support, and biased laws (pp. 212-26). 
Rosenberg likewise finds a limited judicial role in his analysis of 
indirect judicial effects on women's rights in general and abortion in par-
ticular. Media coverage did not increase with Roe; instead, greater atten-
tion was given to abortion in the years preceding Roe than in 1973, the 
year of the Court's decision (pp. 229-34). Political leaders, too, spoke 
more about women's rights in the early 1970s, before a spate of "pro-
women" Supreme Court decisions (pp. 234-35). Similarly, most signifi-
cant changes in public opinion predate Court decisions (pp. 235-41). 
Finally, a rise in membership in women's organizations did not follow 
Roe, but came several years later (pp. 242- 45). Based on this analysis, 
Rosenberg concludes: "I have looked at sensible and appropriate places 
to find evidence [of the extra-judicial effect of Court decisions here]. The · 
evidence is not there" (pp. 245-46). While Rosenberg feels that the rea-
sons for improvement in women's rights "may be impossible to under-
stand or state precisely," he nonetheless finds "the lack of judicial and 
extra-judicial effects of Court decisions" in the area "clear" (p. 265). 
Rosenberg does not limit himself to race and gender. In a grab bag 
section titled ''The Environment, Reapportionment, and Criminal Law," 
he hardly bats an eyelash in arguing that environmental litigation 
"achieved precious few victories" (p. 292), that "only under unusual cir-
cumstances" (p. 303) could courts make a difference in reapportionment, 
and that the "revolution" to reform the criminal law through litigation 
"failed" (p. 335). Rosenberg's conclusions here, while echoing his judi-
cial ineffectiveness theme, vary significantly from his findings on civil 
rights and gender. In those extensive case studies, Rosenberg suggests 
that the courts were without power-that Brown did not effect black-
white student contact, Roe did not alter already rising abortion rates, and 
women's rights decisions did not impact on the wage gap. With respect 
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to the environment and criminal law, at least, Rosenberg is often con-
cerned with whether the courts can effectively manage social change, not 
whether court decisions had an impact. 18 On environmental issues, for 
example, agency compliance with court orders may result in shifting 
resources away from other equally important programs. By "ignor[ing] 
the possible in favor of the principled," "the best-intentioned judicial 
decisions may hurt rather than help the environment" (pp. 281-82). A 
similar point is made in Rosenberg's description of prison reform litiga-
tion. Recognizing that "some changes have been made," Rosenberg 
expresses concern over the courts' "fail[ure] to deal with 'underlying 
issues and conditions' " as well as the possible positive correlation 
between prison reform and prison violence (pp. 306-07). Questions over 
the efficacy of such judicial stalwarts as Miranda and Gideon are also 
raised: Miranda because-despite the reading of rights-the dise-
quilibrium in power between police and suspect remains and therefore 
the rate of statements to the police and confessions remains constant (p. 
326); Gideon because "while the availability of counsel has increased 
greatly, the legal revolution does not seem to have greatly increased the 
availability of the effective assistance of counsel" (p. 331 ). To realize the 
ultimate objectives of Gideon, Miranda, prison reform, and environmen-
tallitigation, Rosenberg contends that political support is necessary (pp. 
281-82, 313, 334). Until reformers "put as much time, energy, and 
resources into political and social change as into litigation ... litigation 
will not be effective .... The political challenge must be faced directly. 
Litigation ... 'is not, of course, the real answer'" (pp. 313-14 (footnote 
omitted)). 
The Hollow Hope, in the end, tries to deliver a double whammy to 
court-ordered change. First, the discussion of Brown, Roe, and women's 
rights indicates that court-ordered change does not effect institutional 
behavior. When implementing bodies are hostile to change (Brown), 
court orders will be disregarded like waste paper.19 When change occurs 
(Brown, Roe), it is likely that that change would have occurred even if 
the Court did not act. Second, the discussion of criminal law and the 
environment suggests that compliance with court orders is a far cry from 
18. There is no question that court action affected institutional behavior here. On 
environmental matters, see generally MELNICK, supra note 7 (examining intended and unintended 
effects of clean air litigation). On prison reform, see Samuel J. Brake!, Prison Reform Litigation: Has 
the Revolution Gone Too Far?, JuDICATURE, June-July 1986, at 5 (discussing widespread court 
oversight of state prison systems); Jack Drake, Judicial Implementation and Wyatt v. Stickney, 32 
ALA. L. REv. 299 (1981) (discussing the impact of the first case establishing a right to treatment for 
persons involuntarily committed to a state mental institution); Daryl R. Fair, Prison Reform by the 
Courts, in GOVERNING THROUGH COURTS 149 (Richard A.L. Gambitta et al. eds., 1981) (arguing 
that courts can change prison conditions). 
19. This phrase is borrowed from LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 14 (1958) (noting 
that without final judicial review, court judgments might be little better than "waste paper" when 
other branches disagreed). 
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court-ordered change. In some cases (prison reform, environment), 
court-ordered improvements in one area yield unintended adverse conse-
quences in a different area. In other cases (Miranda, Gideon), technical 
compliance with court orders seems meaningless because underlying con-
ditions are not changed. 
II 
Do COURTS MATTER? 
Rosenberg may well be correct in criticizing environmentalists, civil 
rights groups, women's interests, and others for relying too much on the 
courts. Rosenberg errs, however, in suggesting that the courts' impact is 
nugatory. First, in reaching his ultimate conclusions on the futility of 
litigation, Rosenberg treats two related but quite different issues as if they 
were the same; namely (1) whether court decisions affect social institu-
tions, and (2) whether litigation is an effective way to reform social insti-
tutions. Second, Rosenberg's measures of the direct and indirect effects 
of decisions such as Brown and Roe are inaccurate. In seeking to isolate 
and then measure the judicial role, Rosenberg underestimates that role. 
Relatedly, his choice of case studies is subject to question. Decisions not 
considered by Rosenberg, such as Bob Jones University v. United States 20 
(race and education), Metro Broadcasting v. F. C. C. 21 (affirmative action), 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 22 (employment discrimination), and Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services 23 (abortion), reveal that the Court's direct 
and indirect effects may be of great magnitude. In the end, the structure 
of analysis in The Hollow Hope and the execution of that analytic model 
suggest that Rosenberg is content in not finding a significant judicial role. 
Put simply: courts-in Rosenberg's hands-seem destined to fail. 
The Hollow Hope is filled with language indicative of an anti-court 
bias. The book's repeated attacks on the futility of litigation do more 
than simply drive home a point. By summarizing its findings in their 
starkest, most extreme form, the book is far too absolutist. In contrast to 
problems of overbearinguess, Rosenberg also discounts the judicial role 
through an often elusive presentation. He treats interchangeably quite 
different concerns about the potential of judicial reform. In the book's 
introductory chapter, he questions whether "judicial processes [can] be 
used to produce political and social change" (p. 1); whether courts can be 
"consequential in effecting significant social reform" (p. 5); and "whether 
and under what conditions courts can produce significant social reform" 
(p. 6). While these measures of judicial influence are quite different, 
Rosenberg views them as fungible because "[a]ll of these formulations 
20. 461 u.s. 574 (1983). 
21. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
22. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
23. 492 u.s. 490 (1989). 
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suggest that courts can sometimes make a difference" (p. 5). In later 
chapters and especially the conclusion, however, The Hollow Hope is 
framed as a "study . . . examin[ing] whether . . . courts can produce 
significant social reform" (p. 336 (emphasis added)).24 
There is another way in which Rosenberg restates his inquiry. The 
ultimate purpose of The Hollow Hope is to help reformers determine 
whether they should expend scarce resources on court-centered strategies 
(pp. 4, 342-43). Of course, if court action has no impact, litigation is 
senseless. It is possible, however, that court action may alter institu-
tional behavior without ultimately advancing the agenda of social 
reformers. For example, social reform efforts would be undermined were 
a state to drop a social program rather than respond to court demands 
that the program be better administered. 25 Rosenberg recognizes this 
possibility. Early in the book he discusses the importance of determining 
whether the "courts are effective producers of significant social reform" 
(p. 6 (emphasis added)), and in the book's final section he criticizes 
apparently significant court-ordered environmental and criminal reform 
on effectiveness grounds. Confusing this distinctive inquiry, however, 
Rosenberg in both the book's introduction and conclusion treats "signifi-
cant social reform" and "effective" reform as interchangable (pp. 5-6, 
338). Moreover, Rosenberg's effectiveness criticism is wanting. In his 
chapters on race and gender, Rosenberg seeks to ascertain the judiciary's 
influence by speculating on "what would have happened if the Court had 
not acted as it did" (p. 157). In criticizing prison reform litigation, 
Miranda, and Gideon, this critical question is not pursued. Despite rec-
ognizing that the most severe prison overcrowding and most deplorable 
prison conditions have been eliminated (p. 306), that police routinely 
read a suspect her rights (p. 326), and that access to a court-appointed 
attorney has grown tremendously (p. 330), Rosenberg's effectiveness 
attack on these cases never considers what the world would look like 
absent judicial intervention.26 By failing to consider this matter, Rosen-
24. For similar articulations, see pp. 22, 32, 343. Rosenberg is a bit unclear on what he means 
by "social reform." He claims that litigation affecting a single bureaucracy is outside his definition; 
instead, social change is about litigation "altering bureaucratic and institutional practice 
nationwide" (p. 4). At the same time, as his discussion of school desegregation and prison reform 
litigation reveal, interrelated but piecemeal reform efforts fit his definition. Moreover, as is the case 
with abortion, reform is often measured by individual decisionmaking and private market forces. 
Consequently, this Review Essay will utilize Rosenberg's broadest articulation of social reform-
"policy change with nationwide impact" (p. 4). 
25. This "policy" argument supports the Supreme Court's decision not to impose liability on 
the state for child abuse connected to the gross negligence of a social worker. DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). For a commentary critical of this 
reasoning, sec Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics of 
DeShaney, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1078. 
26. Problems with Rosenberg's criminal law analysis are multi-fold. His analysis of Miranda's 
impact relies heavily on studies conducted five years after the decision, although the case is now 
twenty-five years old (pp. 326-29). Reliance on such dated material may prove misleading. See 
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berg again discounts the judicial role. More significantly, his advice on 
the futility of litigation seems at best presumptious. 
Problems in articulation, while significant, are overshadowed by 
problems in Rosenberg's measurement of judicial impact. The heart of 
The Hollow Hope is its case studieS on race and gender, studies where 
Rosenberg commits error by seeking to isolate the judiciary's impact. A 
fuller treatment of these issues reveals that courts play a significant role 
in shaping public values. This is evident both in topics examined in The 
Hollow Hope and in related topics not considered by Rosenberg; namely, 
busing, the tax-exempt status of private schools, affirmative action, 
employment discrimination, and state responses to the Webster decision. 
A. Race 
1. The Courts and School Desegregation 
Rosenberg's analysis of race and education is a mixed bag. He does 
an exceptional job in showing that nonjudicial forces overshadowed the 
Supreme Court in making tangible Brown 's demand for "a system with-
out a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools."27 Without 
the backing of elected government, Brown was ineffective in southern 
states, holding out "great promise" but " 'heeded with all due deliberate 
delay.' "28 Furthermore, Rosenberg is clearly correct in arguing that, 
rather than Brown, the moving forces in civil rights legislation were sit-
ins, boycotts, and police brutality.29 Rosenberg, however, incorrectly 
concludes that the predominance of non-judicial influences suggests an 
inconsequential judicial role. This conclusion is based on a misreading of 
Brown, a misunderstanding of how the case influenced others, and a fail-
Jonathan D. Casper, The Impact of Criminal Justice Innovation: Feeley on Court Reform, 1983 AM. 
B. FOUND. REs. J. 959, 962 (reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY, CoURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY 
SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983)) (criticizing the assessment of reform by looking only at its 
immediate aftermath). Indeed, more recent studies suggest that one indirect effect of Miranda is to 
reduce police violence during arrests. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON TilE KILLING 
STREETS 198-203 (1991). It is also risky business in criminal proeedure issues to reach definitive 
conclusions. As Thomas Davies warned in his 1983 study of the exclusionary rule, "empirical 
research .•• reflects [the] tensions between empirical and doctrinal analysis ... [thereby pointing to] 
the mischief that may result from basing legal policy on an inadequately researched empirical 
premise." Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the 
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 611, 678. 
27. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). 
28. CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LoNGEST DEBATE 232 (1985) (quoting 
Martin Luther King, Jr.). In border states, however, Brown did make a difference. 
29. See id. at 232-33 (listing the forces behind the 1964 Civil Rights Act passage as national 
protest, violent response, and the martialing of religious groups); see also PAUL BURSTEIN, 
DISCRIMINATION, JOBS, AND PoLmCS 69-96 (1985) (linking passage of the Act to changes in public 
opinion and to social protest); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN TilE UNITED STATES 
428 (1967) (passage of the 1964 Act explained by "a collection of events and circumstances beyond 
the power of any one person to shape, control, or even channel"). 
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ure to examine the judicial role in race and education subsequent to the 
"first decade after Brown" (pp. 74-93). 
Brown, contrary to Rosenberg's assertions, was never intended to 
restructure southern school systems; instead, it was an opening salvo in a 
nationwide debate on race equality. At the time of the decision, the 
Supreme Court was sharply divided on the question of segregated educa-
tion. In fact, Justice Harold Burton's conference notes and Justice 
William Douglas' autobiography reveal that a majority of the Court was 
prepared to uphold "separate but equal" schools when oral arguments 
were first heard in Brown. 30 Reflecting both this division and its recogni-
tion that its decision would face massive resistance in the south, the 
Court was purposefully evasive in its Brown decisions. Rather than 
require southern systems to take concrete steps to dismantle dual sys-
tems, the Court did not issue a remedy in Brown and then stated a year 
later in Brown II that "varied local school problems" were best solved by 
"[s]chool authorities," that district court judges were best suited to 
examine "local conditions," and that delays associated with "problems 
related to administration" were to be expected.31 
The inevitable result of this "remedial" order was inaction. As J. 
Harvie Wilkinson put it, "the South was audibly relieved by Brown II, a 
victory of sorts snatched from the defeat of only a year ago [in 
Brown]."32 Indeed, southern newspapers heralded the remedial order, 
especially since the Court entrusted the implementation of its decision to 
"[o]ur local judges [who] know the local situation.'133 These local judges 
did not disappoint segregationists, sometimes because they too opposed 
Brown and sometimes because they were hesitant to fight entrenched 
local institutions. 34 
The Supreme Court, then, did not seek to provide the type of leader-
ship against which one can measure changes in black-white student con-
tact. Those efforts did not begin until 1968, when the Supreme Court 
demanded, in Green v. County School Board, 35 that school boards "come 
30. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE CoURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 113 (1980); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. 
PoL 689, 691-92 (1971) (summarizing Burton's conference notes). 
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955). See generally LOUIS FISHER & 
NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 261-64 (1992) (discussing Chief 
Justice Warren's attempt to craft a unanimous decision in order to temper southern hostility); J. 
Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History 
and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REv. 485, 488-505 (1978) (discussing Brown II and the subsequent period of 
southern defiance). 
32. Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 490. 
33. REED SARRATr, THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION 200 (1966) (quoting a southern 
attorney). For other comments, see Wilkinson, supra note 31, at 490. 
34. See ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 15-18 (discussing the pressures on southern district court 
judges in the wake of the Brown II decision); J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LoNELY MEN (1961) 
(same). 
35. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
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forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises 
realistically to work now."36 What can be measured in 1964 is whether 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown contributed to the national dia-
logue resulting in mid-sixties legislative and administrative reforms. 
Rosenberg answers this question with a resounding no, but he is 
wrong. First, both the promise and failure of Brown were lightning rods 
to the civil rights movement. According to federal judge Constance 
Motley, who assisted the NAACP in Brown, blacks construed the opin-
ion to mean "that the Supreme Court was behind them . . . . Brown gave 
them the courage to go into restaurants, to go on freedom rides in the 
South."37 The ultimate failure of Brown also spurred black activism by 
heightening the anger felt over the continuing denial of equality. 38 Sec-
ond, Brown influenced legislative deliberations over the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). On the 
issue of Title VI funding prohibitions, bill sponsor Thomas Kuchel 
argued that Title VI prevented "unconstitutional" expenditures of fed-
eral funds, thereby "furthering a policy of nondiscrimination, and thus 
eliminating defiance of the law of the land" -in other words, Brown. 39 
Hubert Humphrey similarly defended Title VI, observing that "massive 
Federal funds are now being paid each year, to help construct and oper-
ate segregated schools, and thus to maintain and perpetuate a system 
which violates the Constitution."40 For both Kuchel and Humphrey, 
southern resistance to Brown made Title VI a moral imperative; other-
wise, Congress would knowingly fund blatantly unconstitutional state 
action.41 
36. Id. at 439. 
37. Francis J. Flaherty, Brown, Part IlL· 30 Yea~ After 'All Deliberate Speed,' Country Still 
Litigates Desegregation, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 1984, at 1, 27; see also TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING 
THE WATERS 124 (1988) ("[T]he Brown case had brought fresh excitement to the NAACP . ... "); 
Robert J. Glenuon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 
1955-1957. 9 LAW & HIST. REv. 59 (1991) Qegal developments and the civil rights movemeut are 
integrally intertwined). 
38. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 28, at 232. Rosenberg responds to this argument by 
claiming that "[because Brown was so little known] it does not seem likely that the Court added very 
much to the level of frustration" (p. 139). 
39. 110 CoNG. REc. 6562 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel). 
40. 110 CoNG. REC. 6543 (1964), reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HtsrORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES: CtVlL RIGHTS PART II 1212 (1970). Humphrey also recognized that 
"[w]hat is needed, therefore, is a balance between the goal of eliminating discrimination and the goal 
of providing educatiou ... [to] minority groups." 110 CoNG. REc. 6547 (1964), reprinted in 
SCHWARTZ, supra, at 1222. 
41. Without Brown, the "separate but equal" doctriue would have retained vitality. Segregated 
schools-as the south argued in Brown-would then have been considered separate but 
nondiscriminatory. See Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence and Black 
Abstraction, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 21 (1990) (discussing the oral arguments in Brown). In 
other words, without Brown, Title VI's effectiveness would have hinged ou congressional 
endorsement of nondiscrimination standards at odds with Supreme Court measures. There is no 
doubt that Brown made Title VI an easier sell. 
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More striking, Title IV of the 1964 Act, authorizing the Justice 
Department to file desegregation lawsuits, 42 seems a direct response to 
Brown. Act sponsors spoke of "expediting the decade-old mandate of the 
Supreme Court"43 and noted that civil rights groups lacked the funds 
needed to launch separate lawsuits in each of 2,000 segregationist south-
em school districts. 44 The House Committee Report likewise featured 
ample references to Brown: proponents spoke of "implementing the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court" and argued that "the constitutional right to 
be free from racial discrimination in public education must be real-
ized";45 opponents fretted about federal control of education and battled 
for a limitation on federal efforts to achieve racial balance through bus-
ing.46 Unfortunately, Rosenberg fails to make this connection between 
Title IV and Brown. 
Rosenberg also ignores the connection between Brown and the 
ESEA. After Brown, but prior to 1964, federal assistance to education 
was doomed, in part because "[t]he storm clouds of race ... hovered over 
the federal aid fight."47 With the passage of Title VI, this battle evapo-
rated and the ESEA was quickly enacted.48 Ironically, while Adam 
Clayton Powell and other civil rights proponents fought against federal 
aid to racist southern schools before 1964 (p. 123), objections to the 1965 
ESEA came from southern members of Congress who were concerned 
that ESEA money would be used to force desegregation.49 Granted, 
neither the ESEA nor the 1964 Act are principally about Brown. None-
theless, Rosenberg's conclusion that "the introduction and enactment of 
these bills was based on factors other than Court decisions" (p. 124) 
incorrectly minimizes the Court's role. 
Rosenberg also minimizes the judiciary's role by artificially limiting 
his inquiry to the decade after Brown. Prior to 1968, elected government 
clearly provided leadership on the school desegregation issue. Due to 
federal guidelines that exceeded the requirements of federal court rulings, 
the percentage of black children in all-black schools in the south dropped 
42. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 407, 78 Stat. 241, 248 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000c-6 (1988)). 
43. 110 CONG. R.Ec. 6560 (1964) (statement of Sen. Kuchel), reprinted in ScHWARTZ, supra 
note 40, at 1245. 
44. 110 CoNG. R.Ec. 6540 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, 
supra note 40, at 1205-0!). 
45. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 272-77 (1964). 
46. BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, supra note 45, at 208. The anti-busing provision is contained 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1981). 
47. EUGENE EIDENBERG & ROY D. MOREY, AN ACT OF CONGRESS 24 (1969). Brown clearly 
exacerbated this "storm cloud." See BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 17, at 21-22; EIDENBERG & 
MOREY, supra, at 55; Devins & Stedman, supra note 14, at 1246-47. 
48. See EIDENBERG & MOREY, supra note 47, at 55-56. 
49. See ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 25; Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1723, 1741 (1991). 
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from 98% in 1963 to 25% in 1968.50 But the pendulum shifted in 1968 
with the rejection of "freedom of choice" in Green 51 and the election of 
Richard Nixon. Mounting concern over the extension of desegregation 
to districts outside the south and heightened opposition to busing pro-
voked a political reaction that ultimately resulted in the taming of federal 
school desegregation enforcement efforts. 52 This elected-government 
retreat was not matched by a judicial retreat; instead, the courts began 
playing an increasingly active role, which culminated in the Supreme 
Court's approval of busing in its 1971 Swann decision. 53 
The post-Green period, while ignored by Rosenberg, is the judici-
ary's most significant, most controversial, and most debated foray into 
court-ordered institutional reform. Battle lines were drawn, with critics 
and proponents propounding vastly different viewpoints about white 
flight and other forms of resegregation, educational achievement or the 
lack of it, judicial factfinding and management, and school board 
compliance. 54 
Four things are not in debate, all of which speak to a significant-if 
not dominant-judicial role. First, courts affect behavior. When court 
orders result in new budgeting processes (Boston), the imposition of a 
state-wide tax levy (Kansas City), the building of state-subsidized hous-
ing (Yonkers), and the freezing of U.S. Department of Education 
accounts (Chicago), change occurs.55 Furthermore, parents do send 
50. See GARY 0RFIELD, PUBLIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION lN THE UNITED STATES, 1968-80, 
at 5 (1983). 
51. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (imposing affirmative duty on school 
boards to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistieally to 
work now"). 
52. See Devins & Stedman, supra note 14, at 1248-51. 
53. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971) (implementing busing 
decree was "well within. the capacity of the school authority"). 
54. Scholarship defending an active judicial role includes: EDUCATIONAL EQuiTY PROJECT, 
VANDERBILT UNIV., CoVERING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: A DESKBOOK FOR EDUCATION 
WRITERS 111-3 (1982) (arguing that mandatory techniques of desegregation are generally more 
effective than voluntary techniques); GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? 2 (1978) (arguing that judges, 
when pressed, chose forced busing over segregation); REDELL & BLOCK, supra note 7 (arguing that 
courts are effective factfinders whose orders are generally respected); Willis D. Hawley, The New 
Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 214 (1978) (arguing that busing 
neither harms student performance nor leads to significant white flight); Willis D. Hawley & Mark 
A. Smylie, The Contribution of School Desegregation to Academic Achievement and Racial 
Integration, in PHYLLIS A. KATZ & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN 
CONTROVERSY 281 (1988) (arguing that desegregation improves black student achievement with no 
adverse impact on white students). 
Scholarship critical of the courts includes: LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE, 258-83 
(1976) (portraying compelled racial integration as "self-defeating"); RICHARD A. PRIDE & J. DAVID 
WoODARD, THE BURDEN OF BUSING (1985) (describing desegregation efforts in Nashville); 
ELEANOR P. WOLF, TRIAL AND ERROR (1981) (portraying courts as incompetent factfinders); 
David J. Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 PUB. INTEREST 90, 99 (1972) (busing produces no 
academic gains for black children). 
55. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976) (Boston), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1042 (1977); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Kansas City), aff'd as 
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their children to private schools or move to other school systems in 
response to school desegregation orders, although there is typically some 
increase in minority-nonminority contact in the public schools. 56 
Second, court decisions prompt federal legislative action. Immedi-
ately after Swann, President Nixon delivered. a national address on the 
evils of busing and proposed legislation making busing a remedy of "last 
resort" for school segregation, to be implemented "only under strict limi-
tations."57 Congress refused to limit court remedial authority, but 
numerous restrictions on federal financial support of mandatory bus-
ing and federal advocacy of busing have been enacted since 1972.58 
Congress' decision to limit federal enforcement and advocacy, while at 
the same time preserving judicial authority, is telling. Apparently, intru-
sions into judicial power are "discredited and deceitful"59 and represent 
"a basic challenge to the Constitution-and the separation of the pow-
ers."60 However, intrusions into federal desegregation efforts are politics 
as usual. 
Third, court action or the threat of court action is nonetheless essen-
tial to meaningful school desegregation. In most instances, the political 
process has not broken down and the threat of legal action prompts "vol-
untary" reform. Fear of overreaching court orders and the costs of liti-
gation encourage such voluntary compliance. 61 In rare instances, school 
boards look to courts to impose remedies that they support but lack the 
political courage to endorse. 62 In such cases, courts are far from inciden-
tal; they are a necessary conduit to legitimate socially desirable but politi-
cally costly behavior.63 
modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); United States v. Yonkers 
Bd. ofEduc., 624 F. Supp 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
486 U.S. lOSS (1988); United States v. Board ofEduc., 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. Ill.) (Chicago), aff'd 
in part and vacated in part, 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). For commentary on these cases, see 
Devins & Steadman, supra note 14, at 1273-91; Robert Wood, Professionals at Bay: Managing 
Boston's Public Schools, 1 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 454 (1982). 
56. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Private Schools, in PUBLIC VALUES, 
PRIVATE SCHOOLS 274 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989) (state action doctrine studied in light of flight to 
private schools); F. Welch & A. Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation (U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights 1987) (exposure of minorities to white students increased in 74 of 125 districts 
studied, although court order prompted decline in the percentage of white students). 
57. H.R. Doc. No. 195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); see also Richard M. Nixon, Address to 
the Nation on Equal Educational Opportunities and School Busing (March 16, 1972), in PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RlCHARD NIXON: CONTAINING THE PUBLIC 
MESSAGES, SPEECHES, AND STATEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT: 1972 (1974). 
58. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 267-69. 
59. 118 CoNG. REc. 28,845 (1972) (statement of Rep. Badillo). 
60. /d. at 28,849 (statement of Rep. Scheuer). 
61. See generally DAVID KIRP, JUST SCHOOLS (1982) (describing several voluntary 
desegregation efforts which were prompted by the fear of litigation). 
62. /d. at 61. 
63. Rosenberg infers otherwise. He views courts as incidental in such circumstances, 
emphasizing that courts produce a shield for "persons crucial to implementation who are wi//ing to 
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Fourth (and most visibly), courts can impose remedies on reluctant 
districts. The results can vary dramatically. Sometimes judges or court-
appointed special masters can work with community leaders to forge suc-
cessful desegregation plans. 64 In those cases, courts play an affirmative 
instrumental role. On other occasions, court orders provide little more 
than a pyrrhic victory for civil rights litigants. When a school system 
prefers resistance to compliance, court action is not likely to succeed. 
For example, a recent study concluded that school systems can subvert 
school desegregation orders by delaying the remedy, devoting fewer 
resources to predominantly black schools, and aiding white flight and the 
erosion of the city's tax base. 65 Whether successful compromises out-
number political debacles is an open question. What is clear is that 
courts can facilitate success stories, but only when school systems are 
willing players. 66 
On the issue of busing, it may be that "[o]nly a reordering of the 
environment" will result in racially balanced public schools. 67 That 
courts cannot accomplish that task comes as no surprise. The story of 
school desegregation reveals that the judiciary is only a piece in a much 
larger puzzle. Support or resistance from the federal government and 
local school authorities are also pieces of this puzzle (and perhaps larger 
ones at that). The Supreme Court often recognizes these limits; its deci-
sions in Brown testify to this sensitivity. That the judiciary is con-
strained, however, does not mean that the courts are without significant 
influence. The eradication of dual southern systems has always had 
Brown as its foundation; the busing controversy cannot be separated 
from its judicial origins. Granted, Brown and the busing controversy are 
also about politics; but, when it comes to race and schooling, "[p]olitics 
act" (p. 35). The question of whether those shielded by the courts would have acted in the absence 
of judicial leverage is not considered by Rosenberg. 
64. For an optimistic portrayal of special masters, see Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court 
House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 707 (1978). For a 
mixed portrayal, see David L. Kirp & Gary Babcock, Judge and Company: Court-Appointed 
Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313 (1981). For a 
negative portrayal, see Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision 
of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1297-302. 
65. See Paul L. Tractenberg, The View from the Bar: An Examination of the Litigator's Role in 
Shaping Educational Remedies, in JusncE AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS 406 (Barbara Flickered., 1990) 
(summarizing results from survey of plaintiffs' attorneys in school desegregation cases). 
66. A coalition of social scientists supportive of mandatory reassignments put it this way: 
"[While] [s]chool districts who [sic] adopt desegregation in good faith are able to use it as an 
opportunity to increase the achievement of their students, [and to] promote racial harmony ... local 
officials opposed to the process of desegregation can resegregate students within the schools ... [or] 
foster interracial tensions within a desegregated school." Brief of the NAACP, DeKalb County, 
Georgia, Branch of the NAACP, American Jewish Committee, Children's Defense Fund, Fund for 
an Open Society, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Puerto Rican Legal 
Defense and Education Fund, and Southern Christian Leadership Conference as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, app. at 25a, Freeman v. Pitts, 111 S. Ct. 2233 (1991) (No. 89-1290). 
67. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 132 (1978). 
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and law ... each reshapes the other."68 
2. Civil Rights: The Story Not Told 
Rosenberg's discussion of civil rights, while far-reaching, does not 
consider three significant topics suggestive of a broad judicial role; 
namely, tax breaks for racist schools, diversity preferences for minority 
broadcasters, and employment discrimination. 69 These omissions are 
unfortunate. Not only do these topics speak directly to Rosenberg's cen-
tral concerns, they provide a much different image of the judicial role 
than that suggested by The Hollow Hope. 70 
The story of tax exemptions for segregated private schools is one of 
judge-made social policy. 71 Prior to 1970, the IRS granted exemptions to 
schools regardless of their admissions policies or practices. Although 
civil rights interests had urged the IRS to deny tax breaks to discrimina-
tory private schools, the Johnson administration concluded that it had no 
authority to do so. In 1969, instead of seeking legislative reversal of the 
IRS policy, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights filed suit on behalf 
of William Green, raising statutory and constitutional objections to the 
IRS policy. This strategy was successful. 
The Nixon administration recognized the high political costs of 
racial discrimination and responded to this lawsuit by reversing the IRS 
policy and seeking to moot the Green lawsuit. 72 However, civil rights 
plaintiffs, perceiving that the Nixon IRS would be lax in enforcing its 
newly announced policy, asked the court both to issue a permanent 
injunction against the IRS and to specify nondiscrimination enforcement 
policies. In 1971, the court complied with this request. While IRS con-
formity to the plaintiffs' wishes raised significant adverseness problems, 
the Green court nevertheless mandated that private schools seeking tax-
exempt status adopt and publish a policy of racial nondiscrimination. 73 
The injunction issued in Green did not end the tax-exemption con-
troversy. In 1978, the Lawyers' Committee again filed suit-this time on 
68. KIRP, supra note 61, at 70. 
69. Another issue revealing a broad judicial role is the civil rights interests' "capture" of the 
Office for Civil Rights in the Department of Education. The source of this "capture" is a lawsuit 
first filed in 1970, Adams v. BelL Writing about the case in 1984, Jeremy Rabkin observed that "the 
suit has succeeded in placing this executive agency in what might be called judicial receivership, 
allowing a single federal judge-and a handful of private civil rights lawyers-to determine how it 
should enforce the civil rights laws Congress has confided to the agency's responsibility." Jeremy 
Rabkin, Captive of the Court: A Federal Agency in Receivership, REGULATION, May/June 1984, at 
16, 16. 
70. Rosenberg, of course, should not be criticized for failing to discuss each and every public 
law topic that bears on his thesis. Problems in selectivity, however, limit The Hollow Hope. 
71. See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 52-68. 
72. See Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax 
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 457 (1984). 
73. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1179 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 
u.s. 997 (1971). 
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behalf of Inez Wright-asserting that the 1971 injunction was inade-
quate. Prodded by the pending litigation, the IRS under Carter pro-
posed-consistent with plaintiffs' demands-regulations denying tax-
exempt status to private schools enrolling an insignificant number of 
minority students.74 
The Carter proposal never took effect, however. Prompted by an 
overwhelmingly negative public response, including 150,000 angry let-
ters, Congress denied any funds to the IRS to enforce the proposed pol-
icy.75 In explaining this measure, amendment sponsor John Ashbrook 
claimed: "Isolated court decisions and ex parte agreements with litigants 
of pending legal actions against the IRS have brought the IRS into criti-
cism for permitting itself to be used as an instrument to implement cer-
tain social policies."76 
The Carter IRS controversy was exploited by presidential candidate 
Ronald Reagan. In an appeal to the growing voting block of Christian 
fundamentalists (whose schools would have been adversely affected by 
the Carter proposal), Reagan campaigned on a platform attacking "Mr. 
Carter's IRS Commissioner" for his "regulatory vendetta . . . against 
independent schools."77 
The battleground on which the Reagan administration sought to 
implement this campaigu pledge ultimately centered around Bob Jones 
Uuiversity. The issue in Bob Jones University, 78 however, was not the 
expansive nondiscrimination regulations proposed by the Carter IRS. In 
1976, the IRS had applied the Nixon policy to revoke the tax-exempt 
status of Bob Jones University, a South Carolina college which prohib-
ited interracial dating as a matter of religious conviction. In response, 
the university filed suit-a suit which worked its way up to the Supreme 
Court where certiorari was granted in 1981. On January 8, 1982, the 
Reagan administration reversed the IRS nondiscrimination policy and 
petitioned the Supreme Court to vacate as moot Bob Jones University. 19 
A barrage of criticism from newspapers and civil rights groups fol-
lowed in the wake of this policy reversal. Ultimately, through a bizarre 
combination of circumstances, the administration sought to return this 
issue to the Court, withdrawing its mootness petition and requesting that 
74. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296-97 (1978). In testimony before Congress, IRS Commissioner Jerome 
Kurtz referred to conversations between the Service and civil rights attorneys leading up to the 
proposed regulations. Tax-Exempt Status of Private Schools: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 860-64 (1979) (testimony 
of Jerome Kurtz). 
75. Treasury Department Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-74, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979) 
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (1988)). See generally Neal Devins, Regulation of Government 
Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE LJ. 456. 
76. 125 CoNG. REc. 18,444 (1979) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook). 
77. 1980 Republican Party Platform Text, reprinted in 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 63-B (1980). 
78. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
79. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 57. 
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the Court appoint a "counsel adversary" to defend the Nixon policy. 80 
The Court complied with the government's unorthodox request and 
appointed William Coleman to argue the "government's side" in these 
cases, thus permitting the case to proceed despite its apparent inability to 
satisfy the adverseness requirement. 81 
In May 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that racially discriminatory 
schools are statutorily prohibited from receiving federal tax-exempt sta-
tus. The Court explicitly repudiated the Reagan administration's claim 
that the IRS lacked statutory authority to enforce a nondiscrimination 
requirement. 82 At the same time, by recognizing "broad [IRS] author-
ity" to administer the tax laws, Bob Jones University eschews judicial 
imposition of Carter-like standards. 83 
Whether this type of court-directed policymaking is as effective or 
efficient as what politicians-left to their own devices-would have pro-
duced is subject to debate. Undoubtedly, elected government eventually 
would have adopted a nondiscrimination policy. Moreover, public out-
cry at both the Carter and Reagan initiatives helps explain judicial par-
ticipation in and resolution of the tax-exemption controversy. 
Nonetheless, without judicial intervention, a remarkably different story 
would be told. Each step of this policymaking process was a by-product 
of judicial action. Courts either made policy contrary to IRS interpreta-
tions or provided an excuse for the IRS to advance civil rights interests. 
That the adverseness requirement was tossed aside in both Green and 
Bob Jones University in order to accomplish larger political ends did not 
deter the courts in this policymaking enterprise. 
Another example of court policymaking contrary to elected branch 
wishes is the judicial establishment of diversity preferences for minorities 
competing for FCC broadcast licenses. 84 Prior to 1973, FCC civil rights 
enforcement focused on the elimination of pernicious discrimination by 
its license holders. This focus changed with TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, a 1973 
D.C. Circuit decision requiring the Commission to provide a compara-
tive preference to racial minorities in order to serve program diversity 
objectives. 85 
TV 9 was an appeal of the FCC's refusal to value minority status in 
according a broadcast license. The Commission's position was that 
80. See McCoy & Devins, supra note 72, at 463-64. 
81. See id. 
82. The Court held that tax-exempt institutions' operations must not be "contrary to a 
fundamental public policy" and that "there can no longer be any doubt that racial discrimination in 
education violates deeply and widely accepted views of elementary justice." Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 
592. 
83. Id. at 596. 
84. See generally Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 
69 TEX. L. REv. 125 (1990) (asserting that Metro Broadcasting demonstrates that claims of the 
ascendancy of a new Supreme Court era are premature). 
85. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). 
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"[t]he 'Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color blind. What 
the Communications Act demands is service to the public . . . and that 
factor alone must control the licensing processes, not the race, color or 
creed of an applicant.' " 86 In other words, the FCC rejected the minority 
ownership-diversity programming nexus in 1973. 
Through a certiorari petition filed by then Solicitor General Robert 
Bork, the FCC sought Supreme Court review of TV 9. Despite FCC 
claims that minority preferences "raise the most serious constitutional 
questions" and that the appellate court improperly substituted its judg-
ment for that of the Commission, 87 the Supreme Court refused to hear 
the case. The Commission accordingly instructed its administrative law 
judges to afford comparative merit to applicants when minority owners 
were to participate in the operation of the station. 
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved this issue, upholding this 
and other preferences in its 1990 Metro Broadcasting v. FCC decision.88 
Disregarding the judicial origins of the comparative preference, the 
Court rested its decision on the deference owed Congress because of its 
"institutional competence as the national legislature.''89 Congress, 
admittedly, has strongly backed these preferences for at least a decade.90 
Whether Congress or the FCC would have established the preferences 
without the TV 9 decision is another matter. Without doubt, strong 
FCC opposition to TV 9 shows that elected government was not about to 
adopt this preference in 1973. 
Diversity preferences and the tax-exempt status of private schools, 
while important, pale in comparison to the transformative role played 
by the Supreme Court in employment discrimination. Here, Congress 
affirmatively delegated to the judiciary the task of specifying the reach of 
employment discrimination protections. The courts seized this opportu-
nity and, in 1971, put into effect debatable statutory interpretations 
championed by civil rights interests and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission. While court action was encouraged by Con-
gress and advanced agency objectives, the Supreme Court was the indis-
putable lead actor in this saga. 
The principal issue here is the Court's endorsement of disparate 
impact proofs of employment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power 
86. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1972) (quoting paragraph 872 of the 
Initial Decision). 
87. Petition of the United States for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-14, 16-17, TV 9, (No. 74-31), 
reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 296-97. 
88. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
89. Metro Broadcasting, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1990). 
90. See Devins, supra note 84, at 150-55 (citing lottery statutes containing diversity 
preferences, which were enacted by Congress in response to its findings that past racial and ethnic 
discrimination had resulted in a severe underrepresentation of minorities in the media). 
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Co. 91 Griggs has been embraced as "a major instrument of social prog-
ress"92 and criticized both for its "halting and embarrassed" handling of 
the legislative history93 and as a "one-sided pro-plaintiffmeasure."94 The 
case remains controversial today; President Bush's failed attempt to 
characterize the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a "quota bill" rested on the 
administration's repudiation of Griggs. 95 
Griggs' centerpiece status, in large measure, is a by-product of 
Congress' 1964 decision to rely on the courts and not the EEOC to effect 
Title VII employment discrimination protections. Congress opted for a 
judicial model over an administrative model because it feared that the 
EEOC would abuse administrative "cease and desist" power.96 Senator 
Everett Dirksen, a key Republican opponent to administrative enforce-
ment, viewed "a new mission agency like the EEOC" as a "threat of 
potential harassment to employers."97 During the course of negotiations 
with Democratic sponsors, Dirksen succeeded in statutorily limiting the 
EEOC's role to complaint processing. Enforcement was to take place in 
the courts principally through private individual suits and occasionally 
through "pattern or practice" suits filed by the Department of Justice. 
Senate Republicans were also successful in limiting the sweep of 
employment discrimination protections. Amendment sponsors adopted 
clarifying amendments that rejected preferential treatment on the basis of 
racial imbalance, protected bona fide seniority systems, permitted the use 
of nondiscriminatory professionally developed ability tests, and restricted 
judicial relief to instances where an employer intentionally engaged in an 
unlawful employment practice.98 Opponents of disparate impact proofs 
point to statutory language and statements by the 1964 bill sponsors indi-
cating that the title requires "a showing of intentional violation . . . in 
order to obtain relief,"99 that "the concept of discrimination ... has no 
91. 401 u.s. 424 (1971). 
92. Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 
Clu.-KENT L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1987) ("Few decisions in our time .•• have had such momentous social 
consequences."). 
93. HoROWITZ, supra note 7, at IS. See generally Michael E. Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on 
the Theory, Problems and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and 
a Recommendation/or Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (198S) (examining adverse impact theory of 
discrimination under Title VII and arguing that courts should return to narrower theory based on 
intent). 
94. HERMAN BELZ, EQUALITY TRANSFORMED: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF AFFIRMATIVE 
AcnoN 44 (1991). 
9S. See Neal Devins, Groups v. Individuals, 1992 PUB. INT. L. REV. liS (reviewing BELZ, 
supra note 94). 
96. See HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 146 (1990); George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 688, 690-96 (1980). 
97. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 146. 
98. See BELZ, supra note 94, at 2S. 
99. 110 CoNG. REc. 12,723 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). 
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hidden meanings,"100 and that the "[racial quota] bugaboo has been 
brought up a dozen times; but it is nonexistent."101 By contrast, propo-
nents of disparate impact proofs suggest that this statutory language is 
ambiguous, especially since the 1964 Congress defeated amendments 
prohibiting discrimination "solely" on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. 102 
However one reads the legislative history, the judiciary's paramount 
role in defining Title VII is indisputable. Griggs critic Herman Belz 
argues that "[t]he judiciary made its own political judgments about ... 
the need to revise the basic concepts of the Civil Rights Act to meet what 
it considered the public policy needs of the later 1960s and 1970s."103 
Griggs defender George Rutherglen, while recognizing that the judicial 
enforcement model is a by-product of Congress' "fear that the EEOC 
would enforce the statute too vigorously," sees the decision as a permissi-
ble exercise of the discretion that Congress granted the federal courts. 104 
The judicial role in Griggs also illustrates how administrative agen-
cies and federal courts can work in tandem. The EEOC relied on the 
judiciary to transform Title VII from what was-according to the 
NAACP's Jack Greenberg-a "weak, cumbersome, [and] probably 
unworkable" set of provisions, into "the best available weapon" in the 
civil rights arsenal. 105 Despite the 1964 Congress' explicit prohibition of 
EEOC-initiated litigation, the EEOC advised civil rights litigants and 
filed amicus briefs. In Griggs, the Commission argued that Title VII out-
lawed employer practices "which prove to have a demonstrable racial 
effect."106 Although the EEOC recognized that its interpretation sought 
"to maximize the effect of the statute on employment discrimination 
without going back to Congress for more substantive legislation,"107 
Griggs approved this reading, in part, because of the principle of defer-
100. Id. at 7213 (joint memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case). 
101. I d. at 6549 (statement of Sen. Humphrey). For a summary of these remarks and others, 
see GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 150-52. 
102. See id. at 13,837-38. For an analysis of these failed amendments, see Rutherglen, supra 
note 96, at 713-20. 
103. BELZ, supra note 94, at 43. 
104. Rutherglen, supra note 96, at 696. 
105. James Harwood, Battling Job Bias: Rights Groups May Ask Stiffening of '64 Law's 
Employment Provisions, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1965, at 1. 
106. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 249 (emphasis omitted) (quoting EEOC Commissioner Samuel 
Jackson). See generally id. at 244-50 (discussing EEOC's efforts to use statistical evidence and 
disparate impact theory to demonstrate discrimination). 
107. That is how the Chamber of Commerce described the EEOC's argument in Griggs. Brief 
Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America at 7, Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 124, 1970 Term) (quoting Alfred Blumrosen, 
Administrative Creativity: The First Year of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 38 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 695, 702-03 (1970). Blumrosen was a participant in many EEOC policy 
determinations between 1965 and 1967.). The EEOC's administrative history supports this 
characterization. See GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 248-50. 
HeinOnline -- 80 Cal. L. Rev. 1052 1992
1052 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1027 
ence to administrative interpretation. 108 
Congress, the White House, and civil rights interests reexamined 
this judicial enforcement model shortly after Griggs. Surprisingly, in 
debates over 1972 amendments to Title VII, all sides ultimately agreed 
that the judicial enforcement model best served their interests. The 
Nixon administration, following the lead of Senate Republicans in 1964 
but apparently oblivious to Griggs and other expansive interpretations, 
opposed the granting of cease and desist power to the EEOC in favor of 
an expanded judicial enforcement model. 109 Civil rights groups also sup-
ported the continued use of this model. Emphasizing the dangers of reg-
ulatory agencies becoming "captive" to the regulated industry, civil 
rights interests concluded that a weaker institutional framework (one in 
which the Commission did not have cease and desist authority) enables 
civil rights advocates to use federal courts "which are favorable to their 
demands." 110 
Congress followed suit and its 1972 amendments to Title VII forti-
fied the judiciary's leadership role in defining employment discrimination 
protections. These amendments, while neither endorsing nor repudiating 
Griggs, strengthened judicial remedy authority and authorized EEOC-
initiated litigation. 111 Furthermore, by endorsing the judicial enforce-
ment model, Congress denied itself some of the traditional tools of over-
sight (for example, conformation, appropriations, legislative veto) in 
shaping the development of Title VII. Congress, instead, could only 
express its dissatisfaction with judicial decisionmaking by statutory 
amendment. 
Congress and the White House continue to support judicial enforce-
ment. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, efforts to amend Title VII were 
thwarted by both civil rights interests and the Republican right, for both 
sides thought that the courts would prove more receptive to their argu-
ments than the Congress.112 In 1991, a painful impasse between the 
White House and Congress over the burden of proof an employer bears 
in defending a disparate impact suit was resolved by deferring the matter 
108. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) ("The administrative 
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference."). 
109. See BELZ, supra note 94, at 73; GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 420-49. 
110. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 431 (quoting Alfred Blumrosen); see also BELZ, supra note 94, 
at 76 ("The New York Times reflected the administration's success in winning over liberal opinion 
when it . • . praised the bill as a moderate alternative that sought to achieve 'nonpartisan 
enforcement of the law ... through reliance on the courts [rather] than upon a politically appointed 
commission.' "). 
111. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982)). 
112. See Steven Hofman, Civil Rights: Stiffed from Both Sides, WASH. PoST, July 19, 1989, at 
A23. 
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to judicial resolution. II3 
The degree to which judicial enforcement of Title VII transformed 
the workplace is subject to debate. No one disputes that the gap between 
black and white male wages narrowed dramatically from 1965-1985. For 
some, however, Title VII is of little consequence in explaining this 
change; they argue that Title VII merely reinforced existing trends. II4 
Other skeptics are more timid, arguing that the evidence is unclear.U5 
For most, however, Title VII enforcement-especially Griggs-has sig-
nificantly changed the workplace. Dramatic changes in minority and 
female opportunities during the 1970s and the market mechanism of 
employer incorporation of Supreme Court decisions into employment 
practices to stave off costly litigation both suggest that Title VII has 
played a significant role.II 6 Moreover, whether one views Title VII as 
marginal or magnificent, all agree that judicial enforcement has made a 
difference; the debate concerns how much of a difference. 
The above discussion suggests an extraordinary judicial role in 
employment discrimination.· Yet, this evidence can be turned around to 
depict the court as a subordinate player. After all, the judicial enforce-
ment model reflects elected government preferences. Moreover, leading 
Supreme Court decisions generally reinforce EEOC interpretations. 
Finally, to the extent that Title VII-rather than preexisting national 
trends-altered employment practices, market mechanisms, not judicial 
decisions, provided the moving force. 
This characterization may not be inaccurate but it distorts the truth. 
The truth is that courts operate in conjunction with-not in isolation 
from-elected government and market forces. That elected government 
prefers that the courts make policy does not mean that the courts do not 
make policy. Likewise, even though the argument may have been 
advanced by an agency, it is still the court which affirmatively puts it into 
effect. Moreover, what of the many instances where the courts reject 
EEOC interpretations? Finally, to say that market mechanisms effectu-
ate court decisions is to say very little. After all, it is the court decision 
which prompts employers to incorporate potential liability in their 
employment decisions. 
Title VII, diversity preferences, and the private school tax exemp-
tion controversy are powerful counterpoints to Rosenberg's efforts to 
113. See Ruth Marcus, Compromise on Civil Rights Bill Skirts Controversial Definition, WASH. 
PoST, Oct. 26, 1991, at A6. 
114. See THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? 133, 134 (1984); James P. 
Smith, Race and Human Capital, 14 AM. EcoN. REv. 685 (1984). 
115. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE EcONOMIC PROGRESS OF BLACK MEN IN AMERICA 
6 (1986) ("Existing research has not been able to assess fully the effects of specific civil rights 
programs and policies on the economic status of bJacks."). 
116. See Freeman, Black Economic Progress After 1964: Who Has Gained and Why?, in 
STUDIES IN LABOR MARKETS 247 (S. Rosen ed., 1981). 
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downplay the Court's impact. In all three areas, court interpretations 
redefined statutory language. While the elected branches both actively 
participated in this process and often encouraged judicial resolution of 
these issues, the policy directives nonetheless came from the courts. 
Moreover, court decisions in these areas-at least sometimes-rebuffed 
arguments made by the EEOC, the IRS, the FCC, and the Department 
of Justice. In these instances, only a statutory amendment could under-
cut the courts' interpretations. The two-year struggle over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 highlights the difficulty of legislative repeal.U7 
Despite these difficulties, elected government still preferred to give the 
courts the last word both on the private school tax exemption issue118 
and the 1991 Civil Rights Act's dangling burden of proof issue. To say 
that the judiciary emerges as a key player in these three prominent civil 
rights dramas neither overstates the case nor calls into question the criti-
cal role played by the other branches. It simply recognizes that all three 
branches engage in an ongoing policymaking dialogue. 
B. Gender 
The women's rights movement is a story of political and social 
reform, not judicial reform. With few exceptions (most notably abor-
tion), the courts left it to the legislative and executive branches to serve 
as the catalyst for change. 119 The refusal of elected government to put 
into effect court decisions therefore does not explain the defeat of the 
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), the persistence of the earnings gap, 
or the unequal consequences of divorce. Rosenberg is correct in recog-
nizing the predominant role of political and social influences here. But as 
usual, his treatment of gender issues is unsatisfactory. He overstates 
judicial efforts to achieve equal rights only to blame the courts for failing 
to narrow the wage gap or otherwise change the position of women in 
society. More siguificantly, Rosenberg treats Roe as a non-event by dis-
counting its precedential, political, and practical siguificance. While cor-
rect in placing the abortion issue in a broader social and political context, 
Rosenberg unnecessarily distorts the judicial role along the way. This 
distortion is especially clear when Rosenberg's own measures of judicial 
effectiveness are extended to the 1989 Supreme Court decision Webster v. 
117. Amazingly, the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturned seven Supreme Court decisions. See 
Marcus, supra note 113 (front page story the day after Senate approval). For further discussion of 
statutory reversals, see FISHER, supra note 10, at 206-09, 255-70. 
118. When the Bob Jones University case was before the Court, Congress-for the first time in 
four years-declined to authorize appropriations-based restrictions on IRS nondiscrimination 
enforcement so as to give the Supreme Court the "last word" on this issue. See 128 CONG. REC. 
28,068-76 (1982); Devins, supra note 75, at 494-98. 
119. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 302-32; JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND 
INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991). 
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Reproductive Health Services. 120 
1. Equal Rights 
Not until 1971 did the Supreme Court strike down a law as 
improper gender discrimination.121 Prior to 1971, the judicial record for 
defending women's rights has been described as "ranging from poor to 
abominable."122 Rosenberg recognizes this, but suggests that the Court 
has been actively pro-women since 1971. For him, "the clear import of 
the [post-1971] decisions was that gender-based distinctions would sel-
dom be accepted" (pp. 204-05), that "[a]dvocates of women's rights have 
'won' quite a number oflegal cases" (p. 212), and that judges and justices 
are "earnest[]" champions of women's rights (p. 226). 
Rosenberg's assessment here is subject to question. First, increasing 
judicial scrutiny of gender classifications is a by-product of legislative 
reform. The push for the ERA was, in some measure, a response to judi-
cial inertia. ERA proponent Martha Griffiths castigated the Supreme 
Court, claiming that there are "no worse legislators in this country than 
those sitting on the Supreme Court"123 and that the ERA fight "is not a 
battle between the sexes ... [but] a battle with the Supreme Court."124 
Representative Griffiths' rebuke was typical; others in Congress spoke of 
the "default of our judicial system,'ms that "the courts have abrogated 
their responsibility,"126 and that the ERA was necessary to "prod the 
courts into taking long-overdue action."127 These efforts hit paydirt. 
While the ERA ultimately failed, the Supreme Court explicitly took the 
proposed amendment into account in Frontiero v. Richardson, 128 a 1973 
decision in which the Court held-for the first time-that gender classifi-
cations were subject to heightened review. Since 1973, moreover, 
Supreme Court gender cases-even those upholding classifications-
almost always invoke arguments advanced by ERA sponsors. 129 Indeed, 
the ultimate defeat of the ERA is sometimes attributed to the Court's de 
facto adoption of the Amendment obviating the need for an ERA. 130 
120. 492 u.s. 490 (1989). 
121. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (refusing to give effect to an Idaho statute which 
established an automatic preference for males when selecting executors of wills). 
122. John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in 
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 676 (1971). 
123. 117 CoNG. RE.c. 35,296 (1971) (statement of Rep. Griffiths). 
124. 116 CONG. RE.c. 28,004 (1970) (statement of Rep. Griffiths). 
125. /d. at 28,028 (statement of Rep. Mink). 
126. /d. at 28,023 (statement of Rep. Halpern). 
127. /d. at 35,452 (statement of Rep. Bayh). 
128. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a federal statute that required husbands of 
servicewomen to prove dependency before being granted dependency benefits, but granted such 
benefits automatically to wives of servicemen). 
129. See Leslie F. Goldstein, The ERA and the U.S. Supreme Court, 1 RES. L. & PoL'Y STUD. 
145 (1987). 
130. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 47 (1986) ("The fact that the ERA 
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Second, increasing judicial scrutiny of gender classifications has not 
proven a boon to women's interests in court. The Court seems quite will-
ing to uphold "benign" classifications which reinforce gender stereotypes 
as well as classifications rooted in "real sex differences."131 The most 
notorious of these decisions, Michael M. v. Superior Court 132 and 
Rostker v. Goldberg, 133 have spawned a "cottage industry"134 of criticism 
for the Court's failure to consider "[t]he central and inevitable role of 
culture in determining the existence of most sex ditferences." 135 The 
judiciary has also refused to narrow the earnings gap by imposing "com-
parable worth" and other wage equalization measures. 
Rosenberg's conclusion that "court-ordered change in women's 
rights has changed little" (p. 227) mistakenly suggests that judicial activ-
ism has failed to produce meaningful change. 136 The courts have not 
been active in the area of women's rights, and consequently the persis-
tence of inequality cannot be characterized as a failed judicial experi-
ment. Rosenberg seems to recognize the courts' diminutive role on the 
pay equity issue, noting that where "comparable worth policies have 
been instituted, they have been the result of collective bargaining and 
state government action, not litigation" (p. 208). Thus, while concluding 
that "the change that has occurred does not appear to be a result of 
judicial action" (p. 209), Rosenberg treats failed judicial activism and the 
failure of the courts to take the lead as one and the same. However, the 
failure of the courts to take the initiative, or to become involved at all, 
does not prove that the courts are incapable of bringing about social 
change. 
would have had no significant immediate tangible impact on most women's lives dramatically 
influenced the ways that both pro- and antiforces thought about and argued for the ERA."); 
GILBERT Y. STEINER, CoNSTITUTlONAL INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE EQUAL 
RIGHTS AMENDMENT 36 (1985) ("With each such [Court] victory, some enthusiasts for the ERA 
los[t] interest."). 
131. See Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE 
L.J. 913 (1983) (assessing Court treatment of issue); Neal E. Devins, Gender Justice and its Critics, 
76 CALIF. L. REv. 1377, 1384-92 (1988) (book review) (summarizing feminist approaches); Nadine 
Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1686 (1980) (highlighting the difficulty of distinguishing 
that which is benign from that which reinforces stereotypes). 
132. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California statute that makes males and not females 
criminally liable for violating the "statutory rape" law). For an analysis, see Frances Olsen, 
Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REv. 387, 413-29 (1984). 
133. 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a federal statute that authorized the registration of males 
and not females for possible military service). For a discussion of recent legislative reforms, see 
FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 326-27. 
134. This phrase, although originally used in a slightly different context, is borrowed from 
Sylvia A. Law, Re~hinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983 (1984). 
135. Freedman, supra note 131, at 947. 
136. Cultural barriers identified by Rosenberg might well deflect court-ordered change, but this 
is not what Rosenberg argues. 
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2. Abortion: Roe and Its Aftermath 
Supreme Court abortion decisions are grist for the Rosenberg mill. 
Rosenberg limits Roe's significance, both at the time of decision ("[in 
1973,] abortion was not a radical departure from current American 
beliefs, practices, and concerns" (p. 182)) and in the years following the 
decision ("[years where] opposition to abortion strengthened and grew" 
(p. 182)). In fact, Rosenberg depicts Roe's import as especially limited 
since market forces ensured that the decision would reinforce existing 
abortion trends rather than lead to a backlash limiting abortion availabil-
ity (pp. 195-201). There is some appeal to these controversial claims; 
political and market forces have indeed played an instrumental role in 
the abortion controversy. Rosenberg, however, overextends his data and 
his analysis. The Court's role may not be exclusive but it is pivotal. 
Roe was controversial from the start. Rather than "a modest exten-
sion of a well-accepted right" (p. 181) to use contraceptives, Roe marked 
a radical departure, and ultimately resulted in the overturning of 46 state 
laws. 137 That nineteen states had liberalized criminal statutes governing 
abortion in the decade preceding Roe does not undermine the case's sig-
nificance. Abortion reform efforts, while on the rise, typically involved 
the exemption of rape, incest, and medical necessity from criminal abor-
tion statutes, not more far-reaching repeals of criminal abortion stat-
utes. 138 Moreover, immediately before Roe, reform initiatives suffered 
surprising defeats in both Michigan and North Dakota. 139 
Roe also made a difference. Statistics revealing the prevalence of 
pre-Roe abortions demonstrate that the rise of abortions is attributable to 
much more than a single Supreme Court decision. It is wrong to read 
anything more into these statistics, however. First, Roe helps explain the 
rise in the number oflegal abortions from 586,800 in 1972 to 1,553,900 in 
1980 (p. 180).140 Roe's checking of state power enabled market mecha-
nisms to make economic abortions more readily available. For example, 
137. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 12·81 (1991) (explaining "principled" 
distinction between Reagan administration endorsement of Griswold and disavowal of Roe); 
MICHAEL PERTSCHUK & WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE R.lsiNG: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
THE BoRK NOMINATION 257·58 (1989) (discussing the decision of the anti·Bork forces to focus on 
Bork's opposition to Griswold, not Roe); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Woft A Comment on 
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (1973) (depicting Roe as a "strange case" for the Court to begin 
"second·guessing legislative balances"). For a depiction of Roe as a logical follow·up to Griswold, 
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABsOLUTES 92·95 (1990). 
138. See EVA R. RUBIN, ABORTION, PoLmCS, AND THE CoURTS: ROE V. WADE AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 11·29 (1987); TRIBE, supra note 137, at 39·51. 
139. See John E. Jackson & Maris A. Vinovskis, Public Opinion, Elections, and the "Single· 
Issue" Issue, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 64, 72 (Gilbert Y. Steiner 
ed., 1983). 
140. Rosenberg suggests that Roe was little known at the time of decision. That may be-in 
part, because former President Johnson died the day Roe was decided and the U.S. withdrawal from 
Vietnam began within a few weeks of the decision. See JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 7, at 5. Yet, 
whether or not Roe was known, the ramifications of the case were known. Witness, as Rosenberg 
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the number of women who could not obtain an abortion shrunk from 
over 1,000,000 in 1973 to less than 600,000 in 1977.141 In freeing the 
market (especially in authorizing nonhospital abortions), Roe also helped 
diminish the psychological costs of the abortion procedure. 142 Second 
(and relatedly), Roe has spurred changes in access to abortion in the 
most restrictive states (due to increased availability) and among poor 
women (due to increased affordability). 143 Third, the abortion procedure 
has became safer as a consequence of Roe. From 1963 to 1973, the abor-
tion death rate was roughly 5. 7 per million persons, with criminal proce-
dures accounting for 75% of abortion deaths from 1940 to 1972.144 
After Roe, the number of maternal deaths fell from pre-Roe figures of 57 
per year to 6 in 1974, 3 in 1976, and none in 1979.145 
The key to this impact, as Rosenberg rightly observes, is the availa-
bility of safe and economic abortion providers. Correspondingly, Roe is 
less important in jurisdictions where there are no abortion providers (pp. 
192-93). For this reason, Rosenberg argues that the refusal of many hos-
pitals to perform abortions suggests that Roe would have been ineffective 
had the Court approved hospital-only abortions (pp. 189-91, 198).146 
None of this suggests that the Court is ineffective, however. The Court 
did authorize nonhospital abortions, thereby staving off potential imple-
mentation problems. 147 More important, Roe created its own imple-
menting market by creating a need for nonhospital abortion providers. 
notes, the increased availability of abortion providers (pp. 196-97) and the continuing rise in legal 
abortions (p. 180). 
141. See Jacqueline D. Forrest et al., Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10 FAM, PLAN. 
PERSP. 271, 272 (1978). 
142. See Brief for Amici Curiae American Psychological Association, National Association of 
Social Workers, Inc., and the American Jewish Committee in Support of Petitioners/Cross-
Respondents in Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309 and in Support of Appellees in No. 88-805, Ohio v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Nos. 88-805, 88-1125, 88-1309) (suggesting that 
adolescents do not typieally lack the capacity to make sound health care decisions, including 
decisions about abortion). 
143. See Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions: Abortion Rates 
Since Roe v. Wade, 42 J. POLI11CS 372, 379 (1980). 
144. /d. at 378. 
145. See Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual 
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1, 185-86 (1984). 
146. Rosenberg does not consider the possibility that-had Roe approved costly hospital-only 
abortions-market forces would have provided sufficient monetary incentives for many hospitals to 
perform abortions. 
147. Rosenberg overlooks the fact that the Supreme Court establishes its own precedents. The 
Hollow Hope argues, instead, that judicial policymaking is constrained, in part, because courts 
ground their decisions in preexisting precedents (pp. 10-13). For example, Brown and Roe are 
depicted as slight extensions of existing doctrine and therefore subject to judicial resolution (pp. 72-
73, 181-82). This characterization of Brown and Roe is subject to question. See TRIBE, supra note 
137, at 39-51. More troubling, Rosenberg refuses to acknowledge that the Court-not special 
interests or elected government-chose to promulgate legislative standards in Roe and chose to defer 
to state government in Brown. Right or wrong, these decisions were made by the Court, and the 
measure of judicial impact should be predicated on what the Court did decide. 
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Not surprisingly, the suppliers shortly followed. 148 As Rosenberg recog-
nizes: "In the wake of the Court decisions there was a sharp increase in 
the number of abortion providers" (p. 196). This self-implementing 
characteristic distinguishes Roe from Brown. 149 In Brown, the Court 
decision did not create its own market mechanism; instead, external 
incentives (federal funding prohibitions) were required to secure compli-
ance from southern states which otherwise preferred one-race schools. 150 
Roe 's self-executing nature also helps explain the rise of the "right 
to life" movement and, with it, anti-abortion legislation. By providing 
women an unqualified abortion right in the first trimester of pregnancy, 
abortion rights advocates' principal objective had become a constitu-
tional mandate. Consequently, rather than seeking to liberalize abortion, 
reform efforts were now the province of groups who sought to chip away 
at, if not destroy, Roe. By this measure, the greater Roe's practical and 
symbolic importance, the more vociferous the anti-abortion movement. 
If one measures a case's impact by the strength of the opposition, 
Roe's landmark status is assured. 151 From 1973 until 1989, 48 states 
passed 306 abortion measures, 152 which varied in severity from nonob-
trusive reporting requirements to parental and spousal consent laws. 
This degree of state activity in the face of Roe's stringent trimester 
approach is staggering. The principal weapons of Roe opponents were 
attempts to make abortion less attractive through so-called "burden crea-
tion" strategies. These strategies included increasing the risks of under-
going an abortion (statutes forbidding a safe abortion method-saline 
amniocentesis-while permitting more dangerous abortion techniques); 
reducing accessibility to medical facilities that perform abortions (stat-
148. There was only a limited supply of abortion providers at the time of Roe, and it took more 
than a year for market forces to begin to make the abortion right available in many jurisdictions. See 
JOHNSON & CANON, supra note 7, at 7. 
149. Supreme Court employment discrimination decisions, like Roe and unlike Brown, created 
their own implementing market. Through attorney fee provisions and backpay awards, employees 
and litigators have incentives to file suit against allegedly discriminatory employers. For a related 
argument, see Robert L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 
STAN. L. REv. 207, 248-50 (1976). Relatedly, one of President Bush's principal objections to the 
1991 Civil Rights Act's codification of Griggs was that employers would engage in "quota" hiring to 
stave off costly litigation. See Devins, supra note 95. 
150. Correspondingly, agency enforcement of Title VI nondiscrimination prohibitions were 
subject to extensive political control whereas judicial enforcement of Title VII could only be checked 
by specific overruling legislation. See Devins, supra note 49, at 1741-43. 
151. In the words of Judge Robert Bark: "Attempts to overturn Roe will continue as long as 
the Court adheres to it. . . . Roe, as the greatest example and symbol of the judicial usurpation of 
democratic prerogatives in this century, should be overturned." ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING 
OF AMERICA 116 (1990). That elected government seeks to minimize the effect of a Supreme Court 
decision suggests that Court action makes a difference. Rosenberg does not consider this possibility; 
instead, he cites state responses to limit Brown and Roe as evidence that Court action may well be 
counterproductive (pp. 156, 342). 
152. See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 Puauus 27, 32 
(1990). 
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utes demanding that all abortions be performed in a hospital and zoning 
laws restricting the number of abortion clinics); increasing the cost of 
abortions (statutes requiring physician or pathologist involvement in 
abortion procedures); and establishing detailed pre-abortion procedures 
(statutes requiring women to be informed of the "medical risks" of abor-
tion and to wait at least twenty-four hours after consenting to the abor-
tion procedure).153 During this period, however, the Supreme Court-
through ten highly restrictive decisions-stymied most of these reform 
efforts. 154 
The federal government also played a large role in the abortion dis-
pute. 155 Before Roe, the federal government rarely involved itself in the 
ferocious battle between pro-life and pro-choice state activists. Indeed, 
in the decade before the decision, only ten abortion-related bills were 
introduced in Congress. 156 Since Roe, Congress has repeatedly tackled 
the abortion issue; during the decade after Roe, 500 abortion bills were 
introduced. 157 Congress' record here is a mixed one, having accepted 
numerous restrictions on federal abortion funding, prohibited the per-
formance of abortions at military hospitals and federal penitentiaries, 
and funded pro-life counselling programs. However, efforts to statutorily 
repeal Roe by either defining life at conception or curtailing federal court 
jurisdiction in this area have been rejected. 158 Moreover, Congress has 
refused to act on two proposed constitutional amendments: one a "para-
mount human life" amendment that would outlaw abortion by extending 
constitutional protection to fetuses at the "moment of fertilization"; the 
other a "human life federalism" amendment which provided that "[t]he 
Congress and the several States shall have the concurrent power to 
restrict and prohibit abortions; Provided, That a law of a State more 
restrictive than a law of Congress shall govem."159 
Congress' reliance on appropriations-based policymaking in this 
area is hardly surprising. Appropriations measures are preferred over 
constitutional amendment and direct statutory repeals because they are 
easier to enact. A funding ban, moreover, leaves the right intact and 
hence appears a "moderate" response. As more than 200 members 
argued in a brief defending the funding ban, Congress' decision not to 
finance an activity that many find morally reprehensible does not neces-
sarily call into question the correctness of Roe; instead, the decision not 
153. See Albert M. Pearson & Paul M. Kurtz, The Abonion Controversy: A Study in Law and 
Politics, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 427, 433-43 (1985). 
154. For a summary analysis of these decisions, see TRlBE, supra note 137, at 10-26. 
155. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 212-32. 
156. /d. at 212. 
157. /d. 
158. /d. 
159. S.J. Res. 8, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), reprinted in 129 CONG. REc. S514 (daily ed. Jan. 
26, 1983); S.J. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CONG. REC. 21,383 (1981). 
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to appropriate is part of "the inviolatable and exclusive power of the 
purse."160 In Harris v. McRae, 161 the Supreme Court approved these 
arguments and upheld the funding ban. 
Congress, of course, is not the only elected branch interested in Roe. 
The executive branch, especially during the Reagan and Bush pre-
sidencies, has been extremely active in its efforts to restrict abortion. For 
example, Ronald Reagan, who claimed that "more than 15 million 
unborn children have had their lives snuffed out by legalized abor-
tions,"162 used the full arsenal of weapons available to a president: judi-
cial and administrative appointments, court briefs, legislative proposals, 
constitutional amendment proposals, and regulatory initiatives. The 
principal weapon in this attack against Roe was regulation; the most sig-
nificant regulatory initiatives were prohibitions on fetal tissue research163 
and the so-called "gag order" prohibiting recipients of Title X funding 
from mentioning abortion as a method of family planning.164 The 
Supreme Court upheld Title X family planning regulations in its May 
1991 Rust v. Sullivan decision.165 
White House and congressional responses to Roe reveal the 
extraordinary range of options available to elected government in the 
face of a Supreme Court decision with which it disagrees. In the end, 
however, the fulcrum of elected branch activity has been at the margins 
and not at the heart of the Roe right. Direct repeal efforts have been 
rejected in favor of funding bans and regulations that prohibit the gov-
ernment from engaging in activities that directly or indirectly support the 
Roe right. By erecting a wall between the federal government and the 
Roe right, the elected branches have expressed their disapproval of Roe 
without engaging in direct battle with the judiciary. That Harris v. 
McRae and Rust v. Sullivan both upheld these elected branch responses 
reinforces the propriety of constitutional dialogues between the courts 
and elected government. Moreover, by upholding such elected branch 
responses to its decisions, the Court effectively reduces the pressure on 
elected government to respond to a Supreme Court ruling through the 
more drastic techniques of constitutional amendment or court stripping. 
160. Brief of Rep. Jim Wright [and other Members of Congress] at 6, 14-15, 29, Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268), reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 228. 
161. 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding a funding restriction that barred the use of Medicaid funds 
even for medically necessary abortions). 
162. RONALD REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 15, 19-21 (1984), 
reprinted in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 229. 
163. See Michael Specter, NIH Told to Stop Use of Aborted Fetuses, WASH. PoST, Apr. 15, 
1988, at Al. The ban was instituted in 1988 by the Reagan administration and is supported by the 
Bush administration. 
164. 42 C.F.R. §59 (1991). For further discussion, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 
221-23. 
165. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). For further discussion, see FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 
223-25. 
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This ongoing tug and pull between elected government and the 
courts reveals that all parts of government work together (if not in tan-
dem) in shaping constitutional values. On one hand, from 1973 to 1989, 
the Supreme Court's consistent reaffirmation of Roe in the face of direct 
state legislative challenges helped ensure the availability of affordable 
abortion providers. On the other hand, by approving indirect federal 
challenges in Harris and Rust, the Court recognized that elected govern-
ment plays an important and appropriate role in the abortion arena. 
Rosenberg's suggestion that Roe does not provide evidence of extra-
judicial influence because political leaders did not rally behind the deci-
sion (pp. 234-35) is troublesome. That reform efforts sought to limit Roe 
speaks to the potency of Court action in this area. State repeal efforts 
could not withstand market mechanisms created by the Court. Congress 
favored indirect attacks over direct repeal in order to avoid a direct chal-
lenge to Supreme Court authority. Of course, as Rosenberg recognizes, 
nonjudicial influences play a critical role in shaping the abortion issue, 
but he is wrong to speak of "the lack of judicial and extra-judicial effects 
of Court decisions" (p. 265). 
3. Webster: The Changing Face of Abortion Politics 
The Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services reveals the impossibility of seeking to isolate and measure 
the impact of court decisions. In approving fetal viability tests during 
the second trimester of pregnancy and thereby finding "the rigid Roe 
framework" unworkable, 166 Webster signaled a new era in abortion poli-
tics. But Webster's signals are mixed and not readily subject to measure-
ment. While a powerful argument can be made that Webster's impact 
has been de minimis, Rosenberg's criteria can be readily manipulated to 
suggest otherwise. Considering the several instances where The Hollow 
Hope underestimated the judicial role, this finding is surprising indeed. 
By such measures as news and magazine coverage, political activity, 
and increases in the membership and income of special interests, Webster 
appears a tremendous victory for the right-to-life movement. Magazine 
and news stories on abortion tripled from 1988 to 1989 (the year Webster 
was decided). 167 Webster also bolstered anti-abortion political activity. 
In the year following the decision, more than 350 anti-abortion bills were 
166. 492 U.S. 490, 518 (1989) {plurality opinion) (upholding a Missouri statute prohibiting 
abortions in public facilities). 
167. In a high-tech approximation of Rosenberg's method of counting entries in the Reader's 
Guide to Periodic Literature, I conducted a search on the NEXIS library of the LEXIS database. I 
searched the "Magazine" and "Major Papers" files, using the following search term: 
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introduced in 43 state legislatures. 168 This flurry of activity was not a 
short-lived phenomenon; during the first two months of the 1991legisla-
tive year, 135 more anti-abortion bills were introduced.169 Most signifi-
cant, Pennsylvania, Utah, Guam, and Louisiana all enacted stringent 
anti-abortion measures.170 Webster lay at the heart of these efforts; for 
example, Utah Governor Norman Bangester, in supporting a tough anti-
abortion statute, commented that "[i]t's time to get this legislation before 
the courts so we can receive some definitive information as to what the 
state can do to more fully protect the sanctity and dignity of life."171 
Finally, "pro-life" groups experienced growth in contributions and mem-
bership in the wake of Webster. 172 By Rosenberg's measures, Webster's 
"extra-judicial" impact appears quite significant. 
Webster, no doubt, has advanced "pro-life" goals. By suggesting 
that state laws previously invalidated would now withstand constitu-
tional muster, Webster empowered states to place greater restrictions 
on the abortion decision. But that empowerment is court-driven. With 
respect to changes in politics and attitudes, Webster's principal benefi-
ciaries are "pro-choice" interests. For example, the National Abortion 
Rights Action League increased its paid membership by fifty percent 
during the first six months of 1989, and saw its income surge from 
$3.3 million a year to $1 million a month. 173 Likewise, the National 
Organization for Women had its membership jump from 135,000 in 1988 
to 252,000 in 1990.174 
Webster's ultimate impact on anti-abortion legislative reform efforts 
is also subject to question. Hundreds of anti-abortion measures were 
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168. Roberto Suro, Backers Push Louisiana Abortion Bill Toward Supreme Court Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1990, at A23. 
169. State Reproductive Health Monitor: Legislative Proposals and Actions, ALAN 
GUTIMACHER INsr., Feb. 1991, at i. 
170. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 237-41. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. 
Ct. 2791 (1992), the Supreme Court upheld most but not all of the provisions of the Pennsylvania 
law. Because the laws in Utah, Guam, and Louisiana are stricter than the Pennsylvania law, it 
seems likely that those statutes will be struck down. See David G. Savage, High Court Affirms Right 
to Abortion, but Allows Some Restrictions by States, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 1992, at AI. 
171. Maralee Schwartz, Utah Enacts Abortion Limits, Prepares for Bitter Court Test, WASH. 
Posr, Jan. 26, 1991, at A2. 
172. See Anne Kornhauser, Abortion Case Has Been Boon to Both Sides, LEGAL TIMES, July 3, 
1989, at 1. 
173. Carol Matlack, Mobilizing for the Abortion War, 28 NAT'L J. 1814, 1814-15 (1989). 
174. NOW Factsheet (on file with author). 
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only four of these measures took effect. 175 Moreover, only states with a 
long history of enacting legislation challenging Roe gave serious consid-
eration to new anti-abortion measures. 176 Knowing that "pro-choice" 
forces were "going to take names and kick ankles," 177 many legislators 
decided that the political costs of supporting anti-abortion legislation 
were too great. Instead, as the Alan Guttmacher Institute concluded, 
"lawmakers stayed in the 'safe,' familiar, middle ground."178 
If anything, lawmakers switched allegiance from "pro-life" to "pro-
choice" positions. In the two years following the decision, three states-
Connecticut, Nevada, and Maryland-enacted legislation designed to 
protect a woman's right to an abortion even if federal constitutional 
guarantees failed. 179 Twenty-three members of Congress who previ-
ously supported abortion funding bans switched their votes. 180 The 
Republican party also moderated its anti-abortion position. First, the 
newly formed "Republicans for Choice" urged the dropping of a party 
plank opposing abortion. Thereafter, then party Chairman Lee Atwater 
described the GOP as a "big tent," open to all views on abortion. 181 At 
the 1992 Republican convention, this "big tent" kept the anti-abortion 
party plank, but allowed pro-choice speakers to play a prominent role at 
the party's convention. 182 Finally, abortion proved decisive in 1989 
gubernatorial races in Virginia and New Jersey where pro-choice candi-
dates Douglas Wilder' and James Florio defeated anti-abortion candi-
dates Marshall Coleman and James Courter. 183 Moreover, a 1990 
Congressional Quarterly study found abortion to be "the most critical 
non-money issue" in 1990 gubernatorial races. 184 
Webster, then, clearly changed the political landscape of abortion 
politics without prompting significant changes in abortion rights. Rather 
than suggesting that court opinions are of little consequence, however, 
this state of affairs bespeaks the importance of judicial action. By chang-
175. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 237. 
176. See Halva-Neubauer, supra note 152. 
177. 135 CoNG. REc. H4928 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. AuCoin). 
178. State Reproductive Health Monitor: Legislative Proposals and Actions, ALAN 
GUTIMACHER INST., Dec. 1990, at i. 
179. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 241-42. 
180. See Beth Donovan, Abortion's Changing Politics Keys House Turnaround, 47 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 2020, 2022 (Aug. 5, 1989). 
181. Ronald Brownstein, Losing While Winning: The Abortion Albatross, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 
1990, at M4; see also Beth Donovan, New GOP Group Seeks to Erase Ban in Party Platform, 48 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1383 (May 5, 1990). 
182. See GOP Convention: Pro-Choicer to Speak, Caravan "Stalled," AM. POL. NETWORK 
ABORTION REP., Aug. 3, 1992; Abortion Right Leaders Concede Defeat, NAT'L JOURNAL's 
CONGRESS DAILY, Aug. 17, 1992. 
183. David Whitman et al., The Abortion Hype, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2, 1990, at 
20. 
184. Holly ldelson, Budgets, Jobs and Abortion Are Big Issues in States, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 2840, 2840 (Sept. 8, 1990). 
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ing the calculus of anti-abortion proposals, Webster made right-to-life 
initiatives less likely to succeed. Instead, the Roe-created "status quo" 
has become the governing norm-despite the fact that Roe had earlier 
invalidated 46 state laws. In fact, the Supreme Court's 1992 reaffirma-
tion of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 185 was explicitly grounded in 
the stare decisis effect of Roe. 186 While Planned Parenthood also reaf-
firmed Webster's repudiation of the "rigid" trimester test, 187 its adher-
ence to Roe's "central holding"188 further reveals the transformative 
power of judicial edicts. That this transformation of the status quo 
involves not just judicial action but also market conditions, elected gov-
ernment, and interest groups, is beyond dispute. The judiciary, however, 
is certainly a partner in this dynamic process. 
III 
CONCLUSION: REEXPLAINING THE HOLLOW HOPE 
That there are instances where court opinions seem inconsequential 
cannot be denied. Supreme Court decisions limiting religious observance 
in the public schools and prohibiting the legislative veto, for example, are 
often disregarded. The public school cases demand that objecting stu-
dents bear the fiscal and emotional toll of challenging school systems that 
would prefer to heed religious belief ahead of Supreme Court decisions. 
This price is quite high and consequently many religious practices remain 
unchallenged. 189 The legislative veto is a more dramatic, more surprising 
case, for the affected parties are Congress and the White House, rather 
than ''backwater" school systems. Nonetheless, following the Supreme 
Court's 1983 repudiation of this device in INS v. Chadha, 190 more than 
200 new legislative vetoes have been enacted and countless informal 
arrangements have been made between oversight committees and govern-
ment agencies. 191 The explanation for this widespread disobedience is 
that neither Congress nor the White House "wants the static model of 
separated powers offered by the Court. The inevitable result is a record 
185. 112 s. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
186. /d. at 2808-09. 
187. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Packing the Court Is Harder than It Appears, AM. LAW., Aug. 
7, 1992, at 9. 
188. Planned Parenthood, 112 S. Ct. at 2809. 
189. See, e.g., KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER 
DECISIONS (1971); PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS (1988); Robert H. 
Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction to the "Schempp" Decision, 10 
MIDWEST 1. POL. Sc1. 304 (1966); Choper, supra note 145, at 8-9; Frank 1. Sorauf, Zorach v. 
Clauson: The Impact of a Supreme Court Decision, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 777, 784-91 (1959). At 
the same time, school prayer and bible reading decisions were consequential, for many systems did 
alter their practices to comply with these Court rulings. See, e.g., WILLIAM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER 
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967) (examining how Supreme Court decisions affected school officials in 
one school district). 
190. 462 u.s. 919 (1983). 
191. See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 121-42. 
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of noncompliance, subtle evasion, and a system of lawmaking that is now 
more convoluted, cumbersome, and covert than before."192 That the 
Court repudiated the legislative veto hardly matters. With both sides 
benefitting from legislative veto arrangements, 193 market forces have sim-
ply driven them underground. 
The legislative veto and religion cases share a common feature. 
Neither decision creates incentives for compliance. Compliance, instead, 
is a by-product of the implementing community. Consequently, when 
the implementing community resists, the judicial impact is muted. In 
other instances, however, elected government acts affirmatively in the 
face of a decision that is not self-implementing. The demand that tax-
exempt organizations comply with nondiscrimination regulations and 
that broadcast licensing decisions take race into account are both the 
direct result of court action. 194 More significantly, federal desegregation 
efforts prompted southern school desegregation in the wake of wide-
spread resistance to Brown. 195 
Judicial influences are more pronounced when incentives for 
enforcement are a natural outgrowth of the opinion. Employers now 
incorporate Title VII rulings into their hiring and promotion practices in 
order to avoid litigation costs. 196 Likewise, health care providers 
responded to the extraordinary demand for nonhospital abortions in the 
wake of Roe by opening abortion clinics. 197 Elected government may 
strengthen these self-implementing decisions. For example, employment 
discrimination litigation pursued by the EEOC and Department of 
Justice quickened the pace of Title VII compliance. Elected government 
may also oppose self-implementing decisions, as occurred when anti-
abortion funding restrictions prevented some poor women from seeking 
an abortion. Yet, unlike non-self-implementing decisions, where govern-
ment resistance is extremely significant, self-implementing decisions can 
withstand governmental attack. Witness the abortion decision: despite 
the approval of the abortion funding ban in Ha"is v. McRae, abortion 
rates have remained stable. 198 
192. FISHER, supra note 10, at 228. 
193. See Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
207 (1984). 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 71-90. 
195. See supra text accompanying notes 37-54. 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16. 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48. 
198. See Kim Painter, '87 Abortion Rate Shows Decline from '80, U.S.A. TODAY, Apr. 25, 1991, 
at A3. The article cites a Guttmacher Institute Report that finds that while 29 out of every 1000 
women had abortions in 1980, 27 out of every 1000 women had abortions in 1987. Because the 
number of women of childbearing age has increased, however, the overall number of abortions has 
been steady at 1.6 million per annum. Significantly, the study indicates that the abortion rate of 
women under 15 years old and of minorities between 15 and 19 years actually increased. In fact, the 
decrease can be attributed solely to a decrease in abortions for white women over 19 years old-
those least likely to have been affected by the Ha"is decision. 
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Courts matter. They matter a lot. Sometimes their orders set in 
motion market mechanisms which guarantee their effectiveness. 199 
Sometimes the threat of judicial action prompts either settlement or leg-
islative initiative.200 Their opinions influence legislative deliberations201 
and change the status quo. 202 Occasionally, they trump agencies and 
interpose their normative views into the law. It may be that these influ-
ences sometimes result in unwise policy decisions and sometimes exceed 
the proper judicial role in our system of separated powers, but they are 
judicial influences nonetheless. 
The Hollow Hope unduly discounts these judicial contributions. 
Courts are given inadequate credit for what they do, as well as too much 
blame for what they do not do. 203 While Rosenberg does a masterful job 
of showing that courts do not effect change alone, he goes too far in 
refusing to recognize that the judiciary is actively involved in a partner-
ship with elected government. His repeated broadsides at the judiciary 
sound a message of judicial irrelevance rather than one of limited govern-
mental partnership. 204 
In some respects, Rosenberg's problem is one of articulation, not 
analysis. Instances where court opinions are made meaningful through 
market mechanisms or elected branch participation are recognized (pp. 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48 (judicial authorization of non-hospital 
abortions created market for their supply); see also supra text accompanying notes 114-16 (judicial 
enforcement of Title VII encouraged employers to change their hiring practices to avoid litigation). 
200. Settlement agreements are extraordinarily important, for government agencies are 
sometimes willing to establish long term policy priorities through judicially entered consent decrees. 
See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree, 40 
STAN. L. REv. 203 (1987) (describing such decrees and arguing that a president's policymaking 
discretion cannot be bargained away through them). 
201. See supra text accompanying notes 39-49 (describing Brown's influence on civil rights 
legislation such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act). 
202. See supra Section II.B.3. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 30-54 (Rosenberg understates the political and social 
importance of Brown and ignores the controversial post-Green period); text accompanying notes 
121-36 (Rosenberg's analysis of women's rights, in which courts played a relatively minor role, does 
not support the conclusion that courts are incapable of bringing about social change). The Hollow 
Hope also does not consider the Court's influence in furthering elected branch initiatives by 
upholding such conduct. For example, Jonathan Casper argues that post-1937 decisions upholding 
New Deal initiatives reveal the Court's role in "leading other groups and interests in society to come 
to grips with laissez-faire economic policy and the interests that supported it." Jonathan D. Casper, 
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 50, 62 (1976). Likewise, 
Charles Black has argued that the principal function of the Supreme Court is to legitimate elected 
branch initiatives by subjeeting them to countermajoritarian judicial review. See CHARLES L. 
BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT, 37-53 (1960). 
204. Robert Dahl explained some thirty-five years ago why the Supreme Court is not "simply an 
agent of the alliance." Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme 
Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. LAw 279, 293 (1957). For Dahl, although the Court 
cannot frustrate "the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court can make national 
policy. Its discretion, then, is not unlike that of a powerful committee chairman in Congress who ... 
can, within ... limits, often determine important questions of timing, effectiveness, and subordinate 
policy." /d. at 293-94. 
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30-36). But rather than acknowledge the judicial contribution here, 
these evidences of partnership are caricatured as "constraints" and "con-
ditions" demonstrative of a de minimis judicial role. In other words, by 
seeking to isolate and measure the judiciary's contribution, these partner-
ship influences are deemed evidence of impotence. 205 
Rosenberg's shortcomings can also be attributed to the ambitious-
ness of The Hollow Hope. Perceiving that existing scholarship on judicial 
influences is unsatisfying because "findings remain unconnected and not 
squarely centered on whether, and under what conditions, courts pro-
duce significant social reform" (p. 9), Rosenberg seeks to go boldly where 
no one has gone before. His problem-as others before him have recog-
nized-is that "the repercussions of all government actions ramify indefi-
nitely and interrelate with other phenomena, both public and private, 
many of which simply cannot be quantified and indeed often cannot even 
be identified. " 206 Supreme Court decisions "are part of a general milieu 
in which later events take place and part of a set of multiple causes of 
such events."207 
Problems with The Hollow Hope do not mean that Rosenberg's con-
cerns are without merit. Nonjudicial forces, whether political or social, 
are infrequently studied and grossly underestimated. Combined with 
inherent limits on the judiciary's power to manage reform, these nonjudi-
cial forces suggest that social reform through litigation is a gamble. But 
these "constraints" speak to caution, not to the abandonment of court-
initiated reform. 
Ironically, what makes Rosenberg's recommendation of political 
reform especially appealing is that Rehnquist Court's rulings increasingly 
speak of the need to defer to elected government, and not because elected 
government disregards activist decision-making. Federal agency inter-
pretations of vague statutory language are likely to be upheld because 
"substantial deference is accorded to the interpretation of the authorizing 
statute by the agency authorized with administering it."208 State action 
too is subject to less stringent inquiry, for the Court now appears unwill-
205. Although I have not attempted such a measurement, there is good reason to think that the 
legislative initiatives Rosenberg cites as important events would not measure well in isolation. As 
this Review Essay has shown, these initiatives are best understood as by·products of mutually 
dependent conduct. 
206. Choper, supra note 145, at 7. Bob Katzmann likewise argues that policymaking is best 
thought of as "dynamic and complex, as 'a continuum of institutional processes [judicial, legislative, 
and administrative], sometimes acting independently, but often interacting in subtle and perhaps not 
always conscious ways ... .' " Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND 
LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMITY 7, 12 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (quoting 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY 9). 
207. STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT 32 (1970). 
208. Rust v. Sullivan, IllS. Ct 1759, 1767 (1991} (emphasis added}. In upholding the Reagan 
gag order in Rust, the Court found it inconsequential that the Reagan regulation departed from 
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administration standards, noting that "(t]he court need not conclude that 
the agency construction [is the one] ... the court would have reached if the question initially had 
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ing to strike down "a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law" irre-
spective of its effects on individual rights. 209 
Special interests have begun to alter their strategies in response to 
these rulings. The National Abortion Rights Action League recently 
informed its membership that "[c]learly Congress is our Court of Last 
Resort. All hope of protecting our constitutional right to choose depends 
upon our elected representatives in Congress responding to the will of the 
American people."210 Other groups have also proclaimed Congress "our 
court of last resort" and concluded that the battle over the judiciary is 
now lost.211 Although there undoubtedly will be occasions where these 
groups turn to the federal courts/12 reform efforts in civil rights, the 
environment, privacy, and a host of other concerns will now target Con-
gress, the executive, and the states. 
Rosenberg's sobering account of the limits of judicial intervention 
will bolster this trend. To the extent that people expect too much from 
the courts, The Hollow Hope's pessimism is necessary, if not welcome. 
Rosenberg, however, goes too far. The Hollow Hope emphasizes the 
Court's dependence but hardly recoguizes its influence. Rosenberg's 
conclusion that social change can rarely be advanced through court 
action is absolute, and therefore flawed. For Rosenberg, it does not mat-
ter whether the Court in power is the Warren Court of the 1960s or the 
Rehnquist Court of the 1990s-inherent limitations on the judicial power 
will control. 
The Hollow Hope cannot substantiate this claim. Through a combi-
nation of incomplete analysis, questionable presumptions, and indirec-
tion, The Hollow Hope underestimates the sweep of the judiciary's 
contribution to social reform. The judiciary may now appear dormant, 
but it should not be written off. 
arisen in a judicial proceeding." Id. (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.ll (1984)). 
209. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) 
(discussing religious rights); see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) 
("generally applicable laws" do not infringe on free speech rights of the press). Further evidence 
that the raison d'itre of the Rehnquist Court is validating governmental conduct is the Court's 
refusal to support challenges by "business" against government regulation. See Stephen Wermiel, 
Decisions on Workplace Damages Provide Little to Hearten Business, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991 at 
AS. 
210. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 7. 
211. See, e.g., Rev. Amos Brown, Remarks Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the 
Nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court (Sept. 20, 1991) (transcript available on 
Westlaw) ("We cannot lift [Clarence Thomas] up as a symbol on a court that is already stacked, thus 
rendering his one presence ineffective."). 
212. If nothing else, court filings draw attention to an issue. For example, pro·choice forces 
made front page news recently when they demanded that the Supreme Court either reaffirm or 
abandon Roe. See Richard L. Berke, Groups Backing Abortion Rights Ask Court to Act, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 1991, at AI. 
